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ESSA Y 
UNCONTROLLABLE URGES AND IRRATIONAL PEOPLE 
Stephen I. JV!orse' 
A single strong desire is' ojren enough to leave a man no peoce. 
If he is seized by two contmry desires or the same time, the effect 
can easily be imagined. 
Alessandro Manzoni 1 
INTRODUCTION 
I NCARCERATION, whether in a prison or a treatment facility, 
i requires weighty justification in a society committed to the pro-
tection of civil liberty. The United States Supreme Court has rec-
ognized, in both the criminal and civil contexts, that citizens have 
immense interests in liberty and in freedom from other adverse so-
cial consequences, such as stigma.2 The basic justification for 
criminal confinement is that a culpable offender has been con-
victed of a crime; the basic justification for involuntary civil 
Ferdinand Wakeman Hubbell Professor of Law & Professor of Psychology and 
Law in Psychiatry, University of Pennsylvania; J.D., Ph.D. (Psychology & Social 
Relations). Harvard University. I thank Adam Candeub, Sherry Colb, Joel Dvoskin, 
Kyron Huigens, Leo Katz, James Jacobs. Dennis Klimchuk, John Monahan, Mike 
Seidman, Stephen Perry, Stephen Schulhofer. and Amy Wax for helpful comments. 
As always, my personal attorney, Jean A vnct Morse, furnished sound, sober counsel 
and moral support. 
1 Alessandro Manzoni, The Betrothed 316 (Bruce Penman trans., 1972) (1840). 
'E.g., Addington v. Texas, 441 U.S. 418,425-26 (1979) (recognizing that civil 
commitment is a "significant deprivation of liberty'' that can cause "adverse social 
consequences," such as stigma, which can have a "very significant impact on the 
individual"); Humphrey v. Cady, 405 U.S. 504,509 (1972) (emphasizing, in dictum, 
that civil commitment is a "massive curtailment of liberty"); In re Winship, 397 U.S. 
358, 363-64 (1970) (stating that due process requires imposition of a "beyond a 
reasonable doubt" standard in criminal trials because defendants have "at stake 
interests of immense importance"-liberty and freedom from stigma). See generally 
Sherry F. Colb, Freedom From Incarceration: Why Is This Right Different From All 
Other Rights?, 69 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 781,787-94 (1994) (arguing that liberty is a 
fundamental right). 
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confinement is that the person is not responsibl e for hi s or he r po-
tentially dangerous conduct.} The danger a person may pose is a 
justi ficatio n for criminal and civil confinement. but o ur soci e ty 
doc s not permit preventive confinement for soci a l safe ty based on 
dangerousness a lone .' The criminal and ci vil confinement sys tems 
thus leave a "gap" in their ability to confine dangero us agents." 
' Stc:p hcn J . l'vl o rsc . Ne ithe r D ese rt Nor Di sease . 5 Lega l Th eo n ' 265,26 7-70 ( 1999) 
' Ka nsas v. He ndr ic ks. 52 1 U .S. 346, 358 (1 997 ) (·· ;\ fin d in g of d a nge ro usness. 
~ tanding alon e . is o rdinaril y not a suffici ent gro und Ufl l lll whi ch to just ify indefinite 
in vo luntary commitme nt."" ). The re are limited excc pti uns. such <IS de ni a l of bail to 
so me da ngerous de fe ndants, but e ve n such exce ptions are few a nd a rc stri c tl y time 
limite d. Se e United States v. Sale rno, 48 1 U.S. 739 ( ll)07). The quara ntine of people 
with uncontrollabl e infectio us diseases is another excepti o n. but the bas is fo r such an 
incarce ratio n is not dange ro us human action. Compagnie Francaise cle Na viga tion a 
V ape ur v. La. State Bel. o f Health , 186 U.S. 380, 387 (1 902) (a ffirmin g the po wer o f 
the sta tes to e nact qua rantine laws for the safe ty a nd pro tectio n o f the health o f the ir 
inhabitants). 
' See Steph en J. Morse , Fear of Dange r, Flight from Culpability , 4 Psycho!. Pu b. 
Pol'y & L. 250, 256- 58 (1 998). See gene ra lly Ste phe n J. Schulh ofe r, Two Sys te ms o f 
Social Protection: Comme nts on the Civil-Criminal Distinction, With Particul a r 
Refe rence to Sexua lly Violent Predator Laws, 7 J. Contc mp. Legal Issues 69, 92- 93 
(1996) (desc ribing the Foucha problem conce rning the preventi ve dete ntion o f 
dange rous but sane individuals). 
In a recent Comme ntary , Professor Paul Robinson sugges ts that va rious crimin al 
justice me thods th a t substantially enhance criminal inca rce ra tio n, such as ha bitua l 
offend er laws. are be ing used improperly to fill the gap. He claims that such methods 
a re a form o f pure preventive detention because enhanced prison te rms a re 
dispro portion a te to the offender 's desert. Professor R o binso n proposes th a t rather 
than "cloaking"' preventive detention in the gui se o f crimin al punishme nt , soci a l 
safe ty a nd respect fo r criminal law would be be tte r served if the law stra ightfo rwardl y 
segrega ted proportio nate punishment and preve ntive detenti o n and adopted post-
con viction civil commitm ent based solely on dange rousness. He claims that using civil 
commitment to pro tect socie ty in the segregated sys te m would provide mo re checks 
on unjustifi ed loss to liberty than would using th e criminal justi ce sys te m to impose 
disproportio na te sentences . Paul H. Robinson , Punishing D angero usness: Cloaking 
Preventi ve Detention as Criminal Justice, 114 H arv. L. R ev. 1429, 1429-32 (2001). 
I agree tha t many criminal justice practices impose harsh and di spropo rtiona te 
punishme nts and tha t pe rhaps pure preventive de te ntio n would be justified by publi c 
safe ty conce rns, if predictive accuracy were sufficientl y great. See Ste phe n J. Morse, 
Blame ancl D anger: An E ssay on Preventive D etention , 76 B.U. L. R ev. 113, 141-51 
(1996) (accepting the potential the oretica l justifiability o f pure preventi ve de tentio n 
to promote public sa fety but arguing that , under current co nditi ons, it wo uld be 
unjustifiable because it dehumanizes de tainees and becau se curre nt pre dictive 
techniques a re inaccurate) . I see little reason to believe . howeve r, tha t th e a llege dly 
bene fi cial " protectio ns" of indefinite civil commitme nt wo ul d effec tively protec t 
libe rty. For exampl e, I strongly do ubt tha t a peri odic review of sexuall y violent people 
civilly committed so le ly fo r dange ro usness a t the end o f a prison te rm would lead to 
l . 
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U nd o ubtedly, dange rous citizens who have committed no crime or 
who have completed their sentences must be left at liberty if they 
a re responsible. 
Sex ua l predators fa ll into the gap between cr iminal and civil con-
fine ment. They are rou tinely held full y responsible and b lameworthy 
for their be ha vior because they almost always reta in subs tantial ca -
pacity fo r rationality, they remain entire ly in touch with re<llit y. 
a nd they know the applica ble moral and lega l r ules. Co nsequent ly. 
eve n if their sexual viole nce is in part caused by a men tal abno rm al-
ity, they do not meet the usual standards for an insanity defense. '' 
Fo r the same reason, the y do not meet the usua l no n-responsi bi lity 
standards for civil commitment and retain the competence to m a ke 
ra ti o nal decisions about trea tment. Moreover, in most cases in 
w hich civil commitme nt is justified , most states n o longer main ta in 
ro utine indefinite involuntary civil commitment but instead te nd to 
limit the permissible length of commitment. 
To fill the gap, Kansas and a substanti a l minority of other states7 
have adopted a form of indefinite involuntary civil commitment 
ea rli e r re lease than enhanced prison terms. Alth o ugh pure preventive dete nti on 
proceedings are civil and thus sho uld require application of a " least intrusive mea ns" 
principle. I doubt that many co urts would be like ly to find mea ns less intrusive th an 
co nfineme nt sufficient to protec t the public fro m crimina ls with a hi story o f sex ua l 
vio le nce . Moreover . why sho uld pure pre ventive de te ntion require prior crimina l o r 
o th e r dange rous conduct as a substa ntive, ra the r than as a n evide nti a ry. criterio n? If 
the civil co mmitme nt is preventi ve confin e ment based on future dangerousn ess a lone 
a nd is not dese rved p uni shm ent fo r past conduct. the re is no need to rel y o n prior 
cond uct at all. Pure preventive de tention is like ly to be a greate r int rusion on libe rty 
and even more costly than enh anced criminal punishment. T he Supreme Court is 
ri ght to hold that preventive de tention should not be based o n dangerousness a lone . 
Fin a ll y, unenhanced but substa nti al prison terms for se rio usly violent offend e rs both 
a re dese rved and would protect th e public by incapacitat ing the o ffend er. 
' Co nsider the remarks of Justice Owen Dixon of Austra lia in King v. Porrer (1933) 
55 C. L.R. 182. 187 : 
[A ] great numbe r of peo ple who come into a C rimina l Court are abnorm al. 
T hey wo uld not be the re if they were the norm al type of ave rage everyday 
people. Many of them a re ve ry peculiar in the ir di spositions and peculiarly 
tempered . That is markedl y the case in sexual o ffenes [sic]. Neverthe less, they 
are mentally quite able to appreciate what th ey are do ing and quite able to 
appreciate th e threa te ned puni shment of the law and the wrongness of the ir 
acts. and they are held in check by the prospec t of punishment. 
' Bri e f of the States of Illin o is, Alabama , Arizona, Cali fo rni a, D elaware. F lorid a, 
Io wa . Maryland. Massachuse tts, Miss issippi, Misso uri , Neb raska, New Jersey, North 
Dako ta. Oklahoma, Pennsy lva ni a, South Carolin a , W as hington and Wisconsin as 
Am ici C uri ae in Support of Pet itione r at 2 n.l , Kan sas v. Cra ne . 534 U.S. 407 (2002) 
(No . 00-957) (s tating th at sixtee n sta tes have e nacted me nt a ll y abnormal sex ua l 
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that applies to ·'sexuall y violent predators who have a mental ab-
normality or personality disorder."" The Kansas definition of a 
sexually violent predator. which is similar to those that other states 
have adopted, is "any person who has been convicted of or charged 
with a sexually violent offense and who suffers from a mental ab-
normality or perso nality disorder wh ich makes the person likely to 
engage in repeat act:s of sexual vio lence. "9 The state may impose 
this fo rm of civil commitment not only when a person has been 
charged vvith or convicted cf a sex ual offense but also after an al-
leged predator has cornpleted a prison term for precisely that type 
of sexually violent cond uct. Commitment is for an indefinite pe-
riod , and thus potent ial ly for life . although an annual review of the 
validity of the commitment is required. 
In Kansas v. Hendricks ,1(1 the Supreme Court rejected a substan-
tive due process cha llenge to the constitutionality of the Kansas 
statute. The majority's primary rationale was that the Kansas crite-
ria were similar to civil commitment criteria that the Court had 
long approved. 11 The Court emphasized that states were free to use 
any terminology they wished and did not need to use the specific 
nomenclature of any professional group, such as psychiatrists. 12 
Thus, Kansas was permitted to make "mental abnormality," which 
is not a recognized diagnostic term in psychiatry or psychology, a 
predicate for commitment. The Court properly looked beyond la-
bels, however, to determine what potentially justifiable ground for 
civil commitment the criterion represented. In this case, civil com-
mitment was justified because the mental abnormality or 
personality disorder criterion limited confinement 
to those who suffer fro m a vo litional impairment rendering them 
dangerous beyond their control. The Kansas Act . .. requires a 
preda tor commitment laws). As o f 1998, more than 520 people were committed in the 
twe lve sta tes that had th en adopted such commitment laws. Roxanne Lieb & Scott 
Matson, Wash. State lnst. for Pub. Policy , Sexual Predator Commitment Laws in the 
United States: 1998 Upd ate , at i ( 1998), available at http://www.wa.gov/wsipp. 
' Kan. Stat. Ann. §§ 59-29a0 1- 59-29a20 (Supp. 2000). Kansas amended its statute 
afte r Kansas v. Hendricks was decided. The ve rsion of the statute considered by the 
Court, whi ch can be found atKan. Stat. Ann .§ 59-29a01-59-29a15 (1 994) , applied to 
men tally abn ormal sexual pred ators. 
'1 I d.§ 59-29a02 (a). 
w 521 U.S. 346 (1997). 
11 Id. at 357-58. 
" Id. at 358- 59. 
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fi nding of future dangerousness. ancl then links that finding to 
the existence of a ·'mental abnorma lity" or "personality disor-
der" that makes it difficult , if not impossible, for the person to 
co ntrol his dangerous beha vior . . .. The precommitment re-
quirement of a '" ment8l 8bnorn1<1lity" or "pe rso nality 
disorder· ' ... narrows the class of persons eligible for confine-
ment to those who are una ble to contro l th eir dangerousness.1' 
T hus, loss of control was apparentl y the crucia l non-responsibility 
condition. Indeed , this was precise ly the type of problem allegedly 
exhibited by Hendricks, who had a hi sto ry of multiple convictions 
fo r sexual molestation of chi ldren and who described himse lf as 
having uncontrollable urges to molest children when he was 
stressed . A ccording to Hendricks, only death could prevent those 
urges from occurring. 
In Kansas v. Crane , 14 the Supreme Court was asked to decide 
"[w] hether the Fourteenth A mendment's Due Process Clause re-
quires a state to prove that a sexually violent predator 'cannot 
control' his criminal sexual behavior before the State can civilly 
commit him for residential care and treatment. " 15 In In re Crane, 1' 
the Supreme Court of Kansas had again addressed its sexual preda-
tor commitment criteria to decide whether substantive due process, 
as interpreted in Hendricks , required an inability to control dan-
gerous conduct as a predicate for commitment. Crane had been 
committed because the commitment t rial court fo und beyond a 
reasonable doubt that he suffered from a mental disorder that 
made him likely to re-offend. A ccording to the trial court, Kansas 
did not have to prove an impairment of volitional control. 17 T he 
Kansas Supreme Court reversed , pointing to the United States Su-
preme Court's repeated use of the concept of lack of control to 
justify its decision in Hendricks. 1s 
The State argued that Hendricks does not suggest that a control 
defect is the exclusive constitutional criterion fo r sexual predator 
'' Id. at 358 (internal citations omitted) . 
' ' 534 U.S. 407 (2002) . 
'' Petition for a Writ of Ce rti orari to the Supre me Court of Kansas at i, Kansas v. 
Crane, 534 U.S. 407 (2002) (No . 00-957). 
'' 7 P.3d 285 (Kan. 2000) . 
" Icl. at 287- 88. 
" Id. at 289- 91,294. 
.;'' 
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commitments . Rather. Hendricks should be unde rstood as limi ted 
to its facts , which sole ly concerned a control problem . Moreover. 
the control standard is so inherentl y de fi cie nt tha t it can no t ration-
ally be the sole constitutional standard. T hus, any ca usa lly 
predisposing link be tween a mental abnormality . especia ll y a per-
sonal ity disorde r. and sexua l vio le nce (the .. causa l lin k·· standard) 
shou ld be sufficien t. Crane argu ed that He/1(/ricl::.s· orovicl es a clea r. 
~ l . 
limiting. an d exclusive standard fo r the constituti o nally pe rmissible 
commitment of all eged preda tors and that th e standard Kansas 
sugges ted was too broad. Crane thus prese nted a wa tershed oppor-
tuni ty for th e Supreme Court to clarify both th e non-re spo nsibility 
condition that justifies civil commitment of mentall y abnormal 
sexual predators and the cons titutional limits on preventive deten-
tion. 
Jus tice Stephen Breyer 's majority opini on rejec ted pure preven-
tive civil de tention based on dangerousness a lone and held that 
substantive due process required "proof of serious difficulty in con-
trolling behavior" as a predicate for the civil commitment of 
mentally abnormal sexual predators. 19 Although the Court constitu-
tionalized the lack of control standard , it rejected the argument 
that the lack had to be " total or complete" because such a standard 
was unwork able. 211 T he Court reiterated that both the mental ab-
normality or personality disorder criteria 21 and a lack of control 
criterion22 were necessary to narrow the class of persons e ligibl e for 
confine ment. These strict eligibility requirements prevent such 
commitments fro m becoming mecha nisms for retribution or de te r-
rence, which are justifications for criminal puni shment but not fo r 
civil commitment.".1 The Court noted that , in H endricks , the pres-
ence of an undeniably serious mental disord er that created a 
'' special and serious lack of ability to contro l behavior" was crucial 
to justify the civil nature of the commitment. 24 
Defining the quantum of lack of control necessary to justify 
these onerous civil commitments thus assumes supreme constitu-
'" Kansas v. Cra ne . 534 U .S. 407. 122 S. Ct. 867, 870 (2002 ). 
Cll I cl. 
' I Id . 
. , lei. 
,, ld. 
,, J d. 
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ti ona! importance, but the Crane opinion provides little guid ance . 
The re levant language is worth quoting in full: 
In recognizing that [lack of control is required], we did not give 
to the phrase '·Jack of control" a particularly narrow or techni-
cal meaning. And we recognize that in cases where lack of 
control is at iss ue , " inability to control behavior" wi ll not be 
demonstrab le with mathematical precision. lt is enough to say 
that th ere must be proof of serious difficulty in controlling be-
ha vior. And this, when viewed in light of such fea tures of the 
case as the nature of the psychiatric diagnosi s, ancl the sever ity 
of the mentnl abnormality itse lf, must be sufficient to distin-
guish the dangerous sexu al offender whose serious mental 
illness. abnormality, or disord er subj ec ts him to civi l commit-
ment from the dangerous but typical recidivist convicted in an 
ordinary criminal case. 25 
T he Co urt characterized this language as a description of the in-
ability to control behavior in a "general sense." 26 
The Court recognized that this is not a precise constitutional 
standard, but asserted that constitutional safeguards of liberty in 
mental health law "are not always best enforced through precise 
bright-line rules." 27 The Court defended this assertion with two ar-
guments. First, states have considerable discretion to define the 
mental abnormalities and personality disorders that are predicates 
for civil commitment. Second, psychiatry , which informs but does 
not control mental health law determinations, is "ever-advancing," 
and its "distinctions do not seek precise ly to mirror those of the 
law."2"' Consequently, Justice Breyer concluded , the Court has pro-
vided constitutional guidance in the area of mental health law "by 
proceeding deliberately and contextually, elaborating generally 
stated constitutional standards and objectives as specific circum-
stances require." 2y Finally, the Court implied, but did not decide , 
that the Constitution does not require that a serious control prob-
le m must be caused by a volitional impairme nt. The Court 
~- 1 d. 
~" lei. at 871. 
" I d. 
~' lei. 
~'I 1 cl . 
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suggested that an emotional or cognitive impairment that caused a 
sufficient control problem would also pass constitutional muster.'~~ 
J ustice Antonin Scalia's dissent argued that Hendricks he ld that 
a causal link bet\veen a mental abnormality or a personality disor-
der and a propensity for sexual vi olence necessarily imp lied that 
there was a control proble m.-\\ T he jury verdict of commitment that 
the Court reins tated in Hendricks contained no independe nt find -
ing of a control prob lem. T he constitutiona lly acceptable findin g of 
loss of control in Hendricks ' 'must .. . have been embraced within 
th e finding of menta! abnormality causing future dangero usness.,,,, 
Justice Scalia clefendecl this conclusion by noting th at agents who 
are dan gerous because they suffer from a mental abnormality arc 
not deterrable.' ' T hus, the dissent, too, accepted the non-
responsibility criterio n for civil commitment and rejected preve n-
tive confinement for dangerousness alone, but disagreed with the 
majority about what legal criterion implied lack of control. For J us-
tice Scalia, the ca usa l link was sufficient to demonst rate the 
requisite lack of control. Consequently, he rejected the majority 's 
view that the Constitution requires an independent finding of lack 
of control in addition to a mental abnormality and a resultant pro-
pensity for sexually violent behavior. 
The dissent also noted that the majority had reopened the ques-
tion, which it claimed Hendricks had closed, of whether a volitional 
impairment was the constitutionally required cause of the neces-
sary control problem.14 It argued that Hendricks made clear that 
other causes, including emotional impairments, would also be ac-
ceptable. To hold otherwise would make little sense because 
cognitive and emotional impairments could surely cause a loss of 
control. 
Finally, Justice Scalia scolded the majority for the vagueness of 
the control standard it adopted. " He conceded that the mental ab-
normality or personality disorder criterion and the resulting 
m !d. at 871- 72. 
" Id. at 874 (Scalia & Thomas, JJ. , di ssenting). 
-'~ Id. 
'' lei. at 874; cf. King v. Porte r (I 933) 55 C. L.R. 182, 187 (Dixon. J .) (asse rting that 
most sexual offe nders are clete rrable by the threat of punishment). 
"Crane, 122 S. Ct. at 874-75. 
,; lei. at 875-76. 
• 
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propensity for violence criterion were both coherent and, with the 
assistance of expert testimo ny, wi thin the capacity of a normal jury 
to de termin e . But he chided the maj ority 's control standard as be -
ing so vague that it will give trial judges "not a clue " about how to 
charge juries.'6 He speculated that the majority offered no fu rther 
elabora ti on because "e laborati on ... which passes the la ugh tesl is 
impossible. ''17 J ust ice Scalia wonde red whether th e test was a quan-
titative measure o f loss of contro l capacity or of how fr eq uently the 
ina bility to control ari ses.'' In the a lternative, he questione d 
whe ther the standard was "adve rbial ,., a descriptive characteriza-
tion of the inability to control one's pe nchant for se xua l violence . 
T he adverbs he used as examples were " appreciably," ·'moder-
ate ly," "substantially," and '·a lmost totally." '') According to J ustice 
Scalia, none of these could provide any guidance. 
In short , Crane upheld the crucial non-responsibility criterion for 
involuntary civil commitment by imposing a lack of control stan-
dard, but left open the constitutional meaning of lack of control. 
Thus, we can expect that there will be much legislative and judicial 
activity in the states about th e definition of lack of control and that 
the Supreme Court will ultimately have to provide more precise 
guidance. Crane's vague definition of lack of control and its recog-
nition that the states retain considerable leeway to define mental 
abnormality, and, presumably, also to define lack of control, imply 
that most state definitions will be constitutionally acceptable. For 
example, as this Essay will argue,~o the definition of mental abnor-
mality that the Court approved in Hendricks is virtually incoherent 
as a definition of "abnormality," yet Hendricks accepted it without 
comment. The majority's reference to the nature of the alleged 
predator's diagnosis and to the severity of the disorder as facto rs 
that would bear on lack of control-the only two variables the 
"' I d. at 876. 
'' !d. 
'' Id. 
'" Id. It is easy to agree with Justice Scali a tha t s uch terms are vague and unhelpful. 
but they arc precisely the types o f mod ifi ers used generally in civil commitment 
s ta tutes to describe th e like lih ood of future dange rous conduct required t'or 
commitment. I ass um e that Just ice Sca li a wo uld di stinguish the validity of such terms 
to describe an amount of contro l capacity from their use to describe a clea rly 
stat isti ca l standa rd, such as th e risk of future vio le nce within a given time period. 
'" See infra no tes 77- 82 and accompan ying text. 
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Court mentioned-offers little specific direc tio n. Consequently, 
the Court is likely to defer to a lmost any state definition. Ind eed, if 
a state explicitly defined the causa l link to emb race control prob-
lems. the causa l link stand ard v;~oulcl probably be acceptable, 
notwithstanding Cmne's requireme nt for an independen t lack of 
con tro l cr itc rion .' 1 
T his Essay will argue that neith er th e control standard as usually 
understood nor the stand8rcl of 8 causal link be twee n me ntal Clb-
normali ty and se xual vi olence is th e approp ri a te. limiting non-
responsibi lity criterion .12 Substantive due process req uires a more 
conceptua ll y defe nsible and wo rkab le lim it ing standard to justify 
the massive deprivation o f liberty th8t indefinite involuntary civil 
commitment imposes. A lthough the Essay will propose a re inter-
pre tati on of the control criterion, nothing the Essay will suggest is 
strictly inconsiste nt with Hendricks, Crone, and other Supreme 
Cour t cases. 
Part I of the Essay will explain why non-responsibility is a neces-
sary predicate for justifiable civil commitment and will describe the 
role mental disorder plays. It demonstrates generally that non-
responsibility is not entailed e ither by a causal link between mental 
abnormality and further behavior or by the accurate predictability 
of future behavior. Causation-even causation by an abnormal 
variable-and predictability are not proxies for non-responsibility. 
P art II will examine the causal link standard as it has been and 
may in the future be applied specifically to sexual predator com-
mi tments. A lthough Crane seems to rej ect a pure causal link 
criterion, I believe that the causal link might nonetheless be consti-
tutionally permissible as a proxy fo r loss of control. For example, 
suppose the state defines the loss of control criterion for commit-
Ii1ent as "any propensity for sexual violence that is caused by a 
mental abn ormality or personality disorder." Although this might 
appear to be a patently impermissibl e attempt to avoid the stric-
tures of Crane, nothing in the reasoning of Hendricks or Crane 
would bar this cri terion if a legislature or court explicitly found that 
"'See infra text accompanying notes 42-44. 
"' A ltho ugh the Essay is motiva ted by the contro l issue th a t Hendricks and Cran e 
raise , an cl much of the di scussion is the refore fo cused on sexual cond uct , the anal ysis 
of cont rol problems is fu ll y generaliza ble to a ll a ll eged contro l proble ms. such as 
those stemm in g from addictions o r from menta l d isorde rs gene rall y. 
• 
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the causal link embraced suffici ent lack of controL Afte r aiL the 
Court concedes that psychiatry is an ever-advancing but still inex-
act science and that the states have considerable leeway to define 
the commitment criterion. And there is certainly intuitive logic to 
suppo rt th e conclusion that the causal li nk necessa ri ly imp iies seri-
o us loss of co ntrol. This would be especial ly true if the linki ng 
dbnorm ality were itse lf serious. as it vir tuall y a lways will be.0 ' 
!v[o rcover, t\vo Just ices, Justice Scali ~1 a nd Just ice T homas , be lieve 
that the pure causal link necessaril y does ··embrace" a loss o f con-
trol. T hus. the causal link standard must be addressed. 
l conclude that, in generaL this stand ard, even \vhen it re lie s on a 
recogn ized mental disorder , is vastly over-inclusive as a non-
responsibility standard, and , properly understood , it is not a non-
responsibility standard at all. The Cran e majority correctly rejected 
the pure causal link standard, and future judicial decisions should 
continue to reject it, even if there is an explicit recognition that it 
allegedly embraces lack of co ntrol. Moreover, the Kansas criterion 
of "mental abnormality" is obscure , circular, mostly incoherent, 
and cannot adequately guide either legal decisionmakers or expert 
witnesses upon whom decisionmakers rely so heavily. Causal link 
standards in general and Kansas's criterion in particular cannot ap-
propriately limit the scope of sexual predator commitments. They 
also pose a general threat to civil liberty . 
Part III will consider the loss of control criterion for non-
responsibility. In principle , this is a non-responsibility criterion that 
is independent of both mental abnormality and of a causal link be-
tween mental abnormality and legally relevant behavior. Thus, a 
serious loss of control standard hypothetically could be used to 
limit the class of potentially sexually violent people who may be in-
voluntarily civilly confined. ~-~ I argue, howeve r, that the standard is 
conceptually unclear , scientifically and clinically unverifiable, and 
practically unworkable . Consequently, courts and legislatures 
should reject a loss of control standard, as it is often used in com-
mon parlance. 
T he last Part of the Essay will suggest and defend an irrationality 
standard for sexual predator commitments and analogous types of 
'' See infra notes 66-68 and accompanying tex t. 
""See, e.g., Kansas v. Crane, 534 U.S. 407 (2002). 
1036 Virginia Law Review [Vol . 88:1025 
confinemen t. Lack or capacity for rationality is both the quintes-
sential mental abnormality and the most central and coherent non-
respo nsibility standard that bo th the law and ordin ary mora lity 
employ. Furthermore, this common sense standard can be fairiy 
and work8.b ly app lied to identify those agents who are gen uinely 
no t responsible. Lack of capacity for rationality is a ge nuine and 
limiting non-responsibilit y stand ard that wou ld meet substantive 
due process requireme nts for the justifica tion of in voluntary civil 
commitment of sexual predators. Moreover, people with substan-
tial ra tionality defects will a lso typically come within th e class of 
people who, in comm on parlance, cannot control themselves. In all 
other cases of sexual vi o lence, t he criminal justice sys tem is th e ap-
propria te means to protect socie ty from dangero us people. 
I. THE GENERAL J USTIFICAT ION FOR C IVIL COMMITMENT: M ENTAL 
ABNORMALITY AN D NON-RESPONSIBILITY
15 
Involuntary civil commitment is justified in those cases in which 
a mental abnormality predisposes a person to dangerous conduct 
and the abnormality sufficiently compromises the person's rationality 
and responsibility for such conduct. The reason for the conjunctive 
criteria of predisposing causation and non-responsibility is crucial to 
understanding the justification for involuntary civil commitment. 
T he maximal liberty our society accords to adults flows essentially 
from the capacity for rationality that most adults possess.~6 Our ca-
pacity for reason is the ground that supports autonomy and 
freedom , including the paradoxical freedom to be a potentially 
dangerous agent. This is not only the dominant view in our juris-
prudence, but it is also normatively desirable. It trea ts most adults 
as agents and not just as creatures to be manipulated to achieve 
"' I limit di scussion to commitme nts that are justifi ed by the state's police power to 
prevent dange ro us conduct aga inst o thers beca use that is the ground for committing 
menta ll y abnormal sex ual predators. F urthe r, di scussion is limited to the re la ti on of 
mental abnormality to dan ge ro us behavior and non-responsibi li ty . The Essay does 
not discuss the constitutiona li ty or advisabi lity of specific dangerousness standards 
themse lves . 
·"I recognize that this assert ion im plica tes many deep issues in politica l theory th at 
thi s Essay ca nnot address and tha t the capacity for reason is not the so le ground for 
libe rty and a uto nomy. Non etheless, I be lieve the assert ion is an accurate positive 
acco unt o f preva iling no rms o f law and morality and is sufficient fo r the purpose o f 
this E ssay. 
• 
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consequential ends, such as social safety . It also respects perso n-
hood and human dignity. O ur capacity for reason explains why our 
socie ty does not co nfine for dangerousness alon e but instead re-
quires either the commissio n of a crime or non-responsibility. 
The capaci ty fo r reason criterion does not mean that an agent 
must act rationally to be responsible . After all, much human act ion 
is irrational, arational, fooli sh, and even automatic or habit ua l. 
No ne the less, a guiding assum pt ion or law and morali ty is that mos t 
age nts re tain the capacity to be guided by reaso n and it is their 
duty to exercise that capacity when important interests are at 
stake ."7 If they retai n that ca pacity, they may be held responsible . 
If agents are not responsible, however, because they are not ca-
pable of being guided by reason in a particular context, then 
special legal rules that express and impose the consequences of 
non-responsibility apply to them. Such legal rules include various 
incompetencies, legal insanity, and involuntary civil commitment. 
We do not preventively confine even the most dangerous agen ts 
unless they have been convicted of a crime or are not responsible. 
Involuntary civil commitment is morally and legally justifiable only 
if a citizen subject to such commitment is not responsible for the 
dangerous behavior that creates the need for confinement. The 
crucial question, then, is the relation of mental abnormality to non-
responsibility. 
First , consider the case of a potentially violent person with a 
mental abnormality that is unrelated to the agent 's violence poten-
tial. Such an agent is simply a potentially violent person who happens 
to have a co-occurring mental abnormality. The abnormality is no 
more relevant to the violence potential and to the agent's respon-
sibility for potential violence than th e color of the person 's eyes . 
Because we do not preventively confine citizens on the ground of 
dangerousness alone, there is no justification for committing such 
people. 
When mental abnormality is causally related to legally releva nt 
behavior, such as violent, future conduct, two effects are possible: 
"Consid e r, for exa mple, which leg one puts thro ugh on e's underpants first. It is 
ha rd to imagine behavi o r that is more automatic, more thoughtless, or more ha bitu a l. 
No thing turns on which leg is first, however. If se rious conseque nces we re to flow 
from thi s choice , virtua lly a ll agen ts would re tain sufficient capacity for reason to 
cause themselves to pay a tt e ntion and to break th e life-long habit , if necessary. 
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the abnormality may play a predisposing ca usa l ro le, and the ab-
normality may un dermine the agent's responsibili ty for the legally 
relevant behavior. Consider first how a mental abnorm al ity may 
ope rate as a predisposing cause of behavior. A men tal abnormality 
does not cause lega ll y re levant bodily movements to become mere 
biophysical mech anisms, like the jerk of an arm that an unco n-
trolled neurological disorder may prod uce . A bn o rm al tho ughts, 
des ires . perce pti ons . and the like are not simply irresi sti ble me-
cha nical causes of further cond uct. even iL ultimately. biophysical 
explanations can be given for them (and fo r norma l thoughts, de-
sires, an d perceptions). Rather, such abnormalities create irrational 
reasons for acti on or compromise the agent 's ge nera l capacity for 
rationality. A mental abnormality thus sometimes piays a causal 
role by affecting the agent's practical reasoning th at leads to the le-
gally relevant behavior. If such irrationality had not existed , the 
legally relevant behavior would have been less like ly to occur. A 
mental abnormality is not a necessary cause of legally relevant be-
havior-and it is virtually never sufficient-but it may be a strongly 
predisposing cause . 
Mental abnormality also sometimes plays a causal role by un-
dermining the agent's capacity for self-control or by causing an 
agent to "lose control. " Although this is a common form of usage , I 
suggest in Part IV that this explanation of the causal role of mental 
disorder is confused or better explained in terms of rationality . 
Rationality and irrationality are continuum concepts. In some 
cases, causal abnormality may undermine the capacity for rational-
ity sufficiently to warrant the further conclusion that the agent was 
also not responsible for the behavior the abnormality caused.-~~ 
W hether the agent was suffering fro m a mental abnormalitl<~ and 
" For a di scussion of the criteri a for rationality. see infra notes 103~104 and 
accompanying text and infra text accompanying note 117. 
"" This Essay does not enter highly tech nical phil osophical and psycho logical 
debates about the validity of a disorder or disease conce ption of mental abnormality. 
It will simply assume that a sound defense of such a conce pt ion can be provided and 
that mental abnormalities are e ntities that ex ist in nature and are not simply social 
constructions. This assumption is of course controversial. Sec Ian Hacking. The Social 
Construction of What? 100~04 (1999) (d iscussing whether " men tal di so rder" is a 
b iologica l or a social construction). Sec genera lly A llan V. Horwitz, Creat ing Mental 
Illness (2002) (providi ng a history of the modern development of th e concept of 
mental di sorder and a critique of much modern diag nostic practice. basc:cl on social 
-
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how much irrationality it produced are factual qu es ti o ns , but de -
Ierrnini ng how much ra tional cap aci ty one must lack to conclude 
th<tl an agent is not respo nsible is a normative quest ion . T he de-
gree of irration ality required might vary from con text to co ntex t. 
For example , the amount of irrationa li ty that wo uld permi t a find-
ing ol' incompe ten ce to co nt ract need no t be th e sa me as the 
~ t moun t necessary to avo id crimina l li <1 hilit y. No net hel ess , it should 
lx ciear that the lack of capacity for rat io nality necessa ry to sup-
port involuntary civil confin ement sh o uld be subst anti a l, especia lly 
if such confi nement is indefinite. ·wh ateve r irra tion a lity standard is 
app lied, however , it is crucial to recognize th at concl usions abo ut 
causat ion and non-responsibility are independ ent. 
Conside r, for exampl e, a case in wh ich mental abnor mality pl ays 
a causally predisposing role in the agent 's potential for violence . 
Suppose th at, as the res ult of a recogn ized mental abnorm ality, the 
age nt is suspici ous, '0 has problems controll ing ange r and impulses ,"1 
or has detached interpersonal relatio ns. "" Such characterist ics , es-
pecially if they are relatively extreme, may indeed predispose a 
person to act violently by making it harder for the agent to bring 
reason to bear. Why , however, should th ose characteristics also en-
tail that th e agent is not responsible if the agen t does act vio lently? 
People with such characteristics, like sexual preda tors, will seldom 
succeed with an insanity defense. Although th ese signs and symp-
toms o f mental abnormality m ay compromise the capaci ty for 
ra tion ality, as do normal conditions such as stress or fatigu e, they 
virtually never do so suffi ciently to undermin e responsibility. 
cons truct ivist acco unts). None theless, the ass ump ti on that menta l di so rders are va lid 
e ntities is the dominant view wit hin the men ta l hea lth pro fessio ns. A lth o ugh 
legislato rs and judges may be aware of problems with th e concep tua l, scien tific , and 
cl inical unders tanding of menta l diso rders , they a re unlike ly to reject the do min ant 
V I e W. 
so Susp iciousness is a symptom o f both pa ranoid pe rsonality disorder and 
schizotypal personali ty disorder. See Am. Psychiat ri c Ass'n, Di agnosti c and Stati stica l 
Ma nual of Menta l Disorders 694, 701 (4th eel. & Text Re vision 2000) [he reina ft e r 
DSM-IV-TR]. Whe ther there is an unde rl ying disorder inde pendent o f the symptom 
or whether th e di so rder is constituted by the sym ptom is often a fra ugh t ques tion. See 
infra tex t acco mpanying note 66. I simply accept the dominant view th a t the re must 
be som e type o f underlying abn ormality. 
' ' Ange r a nd impulse contro l problems a re symptoms o f borde rline pe rsona li ty 
di so rde r. D SM -IV-T R, supra note 50, at 710. 
s~ De tached inte rpe rsona l re lations a re a symptom o r schi zoid personality disorde r. 
l ei . at 697. 
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\V hether a p redisposing fac tor is produced by a men ta l di sorde r 
or by some other '·normal" or "abnormal " cause makes no d iffer-
ence to whethe r the agent is responsible. A cause is just a cause, 
and causation per se is no t an excuse , whether th e ca usat ion is 
.. normal " or '· abnorma l. " If ca usa ti on were an excuse , no one 
\vouid be res pons ibl e for any conduct , becau se all beh avior is 
caused by mult ip le vari ab les not within the age nt' s contro l. '; A 
gen ui ne non- respo nsib ility condition , such as suffici e nt iack of ra-
ti ona l capacity. must a lso be present. If it were not. con fin ement 
woul d be j us tifi c c! by dangerousness alone. A predi sposing me ntal 
disorder wo uld th en be nothing more than a cause . li ke an y other 
potentia l cause , tha t helps us to predict dangerousness . 
Many people with severe mental disorders tha t predispose them 
to legally re levant conduct are responsible for the ir conduct be-
cause they retain sufficient capacity for rationali ty to be considered 
com petent or blameworthy. For example , it is a commonplace in 
criminal law that many defendants suffering from mental disorders 
th at predispose them to crime are considered sufficiently ra tional 
to be held responsibl e and are punished. Hendricks and C rane are 
examples of defendants with predisposing mental disorders who 
were convicted and punished for their conduct. Conduct that is 
properly considered a sign or symptom of an underlying di sorder is 
nonetheless human action, and no conclusio n about non-
responsibi lity is entailed. We cannot simply infer non- resp o nsibili ty 
without begging the ques ti on of what should co unt as an excusing 
condition .'.\ Indeed , the American Psychiatric Associat ion explicit ly 
warns that psychiatric diagnoses and crite ria entail no lega l conclu-
sions about responsibility or even about whether an agent meets 
legal crite ria for the presence of a mental disorder. 55 T he menta l 
abnorm ality must also compromise the agent's ration ality because 
deficient capacity for rationality is the genuine condit ion for non-
responsibility. 
' 'Michael S. Moore. Ca usa tion and the Excuses, 73 Ca l. L. Rev. 1091 , 1112-] 4 
(1 985) : Stephen J. Morse , Culp ab ility and Control, 142 U . Pa. L. Rev. 1587, 1592- 94 
(1 994) . 
'' Herbert Fingarette & A nne Fingarett e H asse, Mental Disa bili ties and Crimi nal 
Respons ibility 55-65 (1979). 
'' DSM-IV-TR. supra note 50, a t xxxii- xxxiii , xxxvii . 
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Consider the analogy of the insanity defense. The crite ria for th e 
dominant, ''cognitive" insanity defense tests include a mental ab-
norm ality that causes a furth er, necessary defect in ra tionality. For 
exam ple , the lvf 'Naglzterz test requires that the menta l abn ormality 
ca use the person not to know the nature and qual ity of the act or 
no t to know that it was wrong. '" The cognitive crite ri a o f th e 
A merican Law Institute's Model Penal Code test require me nta l 
abnorm a lity to produce a lac k of su bstantial capacity to appreciate 
the cri minali ty or wrongfuln ess o f one's act. ' 7 Aga in , conclusions 
about irration ality caused by abnormality and about responsibi lity 
are re lated but independent from one another. A causa l re latio n 
be twee n abnormality and other behavior does no t entail th a t th e 
agent is not responsible for the other behavior. The prese nce o f a 
causal link is an over-inclusive indicator of non-responsibility .'' 
A lthough our socie ty might be considerably safer if we were 
willing to confine predictably dangerous agents, predictability is 
also not per se a criterion of non-responsibility. We are incontro-
vertibl y responsible for much behavior that is entirely predictable . 
Successful human interaction would be impossible if this were not 
true. Furthermore, understanding the causes of behavior may en-
hance the predictability of that behavior, but this does not 
necessarily undermine responsibility. For example, there is a strong 
correlation in our society between poverty and certain forms of 
crime , and many people think that poverty is a cause of such crimi-
nal conduct. Poverty is thus a risk factor and increases the 
predictive likelihood that a poor person will commit some types of 
crime. I t would be illogical and disrespectful, however, to claim 
'" M'Naghten 's Case, 10 Cl. & F. 200,210 (H.L. 1843) (Eng.). 
'' Mode l Penal Code~ 4.01 (1) (1962) . 
" Failure to recognize the over-in clusiveness of a simple ca usal rel a ti o n as a 
criterion for non-responsibility was the fatal fl aw in the infamous "product '' rule for 
legal insanity ado pted by the United States Court of Appeals fo r the District o f 
Columbi a. Durh am v. U nited States, 214 F 2cl 862, 874- 75 (D.C. Cir. 1954) (adopting 
the rul e that the defe ndant is excused if the unl awful act was th e " product' ' o f menta l 
di sease o r defect) , overrul ed by United States v. Brawner, 471 F.2d 969. 989-95 (D. C. 
Cir. 1972) (ado pting compo nents o f th e Mode l Penal Code s tandard). All insanity 
de fense tri a ls in fede ral co urts are now gove rned by the test Congress ado pted in 
1984.1 8 U.S.C. ~ l7(a) (2002) (adoptin g a cognitive test and requiring the presence of 
a "seve re ·· ment al di sease or defect). 
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that poverty per se renders poor criminals non-responsible. 09 Pov-
erty is just a cause, albeit a cause that enhances predictability. 
Whether mental disorder or any other ''normal" or "abnormal" 
cause enhances the predictability of any behavior does not mean 
that the agent is less responsible for the behavior. Predictability per 
se , whether or not enhanced by causal understanding, does not un-
dermine responsibility.''" 
Civil commitment is a massive intrusion on liberty that can be 
justified only by limiting it to cases in which an agent is genuinely 
not responsible for legally relevant conduct, such as violent behav-
ior. Causation, wh ether by normal or abnormal causes, and 
predictability are not per se proper non-responsibility criteria. This 
Essay therefore turns to alternatives. 
II. THE CAUSAL LINK STANDARD 
Kansas argued in Crane, and the dissent agreed, that a causally 
predisposing link between mental abnormality and sexual violence 
should be a constitutionally acceptable limiting criterion for the in-
voluntary civil confinement of sexual predators. 61 The preceding 
Part argued generally that causal link standards are poor proxies 
for non-responsibility. This Part specifically considers and rejects 
the validity of causal link standards for non-responsibility. 
Causal link standards appear facially plausible, especially if they 
are coupled with a recognition that the link embraces a control 
problem. After all, if mental abnormality-by definition a behav-
ioral defect-predisposes an agent to engage in sexually violent 
'''Some have argued that poverty or deprivation is per se an excusing factor, but 
such arguments confuse causation with excuse and are ultimately unpersuasive. See 
Stephen J. Morse, Deprivation and Desert, in From Social JL'sticc to Criminal Justice: 
Poverty and the Administration of Criminal Law 114, 140--54 (William Heffernan & 
John Kleinig eels., 2000) (reviewing and rejecting the various arguments for why 
poverty or deprivation per se should excuse). 
"'As noted previously, desires for social safety might justify pure preventive 
detention, if predictive accuracy were sufficiently great, but preventive detention 
would be pure because predictability does not per se undermine responsibility. See 
supra note 4. 
' 1 Crane, 122 S. Ct. at 875-76 (Scalia, J., dissenting). See also In re Leon G, 26 P.3d 
481 (Ariz. 2001), in which the Arizona Supreme Court held, contrary to the Kansas 
Supreme Court's decision in Crane, that an independent control defect is not required 
by substantive clue process as a predicate for involuntary civil commitment of sexual 
predators and that the causal link standard is constitutionally acceptable. 
I 
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co nduct, the abnorm ality must und ermine control ca pacity e ithe r 
d irectly or indirectly by compro mising ration ality. Nonethe less, this 
Part argues th at, even if th e required predi ca te abn ormality is a 
recognized, arguably severe disorde r. as Just ice Breyer 's H endrick s 
di ssent s uggeste d ,~>" the causal link is vas tly ove r-inclusive as a gen-
e ral cri terion for th e necessa ry non-responsibility co nditi o n that 
justifi es preve nti ve civil confin ement. Moreover, ne ither H en dricks 
nor Crone specificall y re quired that the menta l abn ormality had to 
be a seve re, recognized men ta l d iso rder. Consequ ent ly, the type of 
me nta l abnormality cri te rion adopted by Kansas and othe r states, 
which the Court accepted, is no t onl y over-inclusive; it al so places 
essenti all y no non-responsibili ty limi t on commitment. The crite-
rion is so broad that it applies to any perso n who co mmits sexual 
violence, and, more generally , it appli es to all behavior , normal and 
abnormal alike. It is no t a definition of abnormality a t all. 
As Part I demonstrated, a causally predisposing link be tween 
mental abnormality and legally relevant behavior is neither a nec-
essary nor sufficient non-responsibility crite rion."3 In particular, 
identifying a cause for behavior, including an abnormal cause, does 
not mean that the agent cannot contro l the behavior. Causation is 
no t per se an excusing condition; causation is not the opposite of 
control ; the causal link between abnormality and conduct is not 
mechanistically inexorable; and it is simply not the case that all 
conduct causally influenced by mental abnormality also indicates a 
sufficient defect in rationality to warrant the conclusion that the 
agent was not responsible."4 The causal lin k simply describes the 
causa ti on of action. Although all acti ons are caused , not all actions 
are generated by lack of contro l capacity or by substantial rational-
ity defects. A s Part I also demonstrated , predictability, even when 
enhanced by causal understanding, is also no t a non-responsibility 
condition per se . Even if behavior caused by an abnormality is 
more predictable than the same behavior caused "normally, " it 
does not follow that abnormal causa tion is a non-responsibility 
conditi on. Moreover, demographic and behavioral variables, espe-
"2 Kansas v. H endri cks , 521 U.S. 346,375-76 (1 997) (Breyer, J. disse nting) . 
6
·' See supra Part I. 
"' Indeed , ca usa l menta l abnormality can pa radoxica ll y increase ra tio na li ty . For 
exampl e, mild bu t di agnosable manic sta tes might heighten an age nt 's cla rity o f 
tho ugh t and percep tual powers. 
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cially past history, are far more likely to be valid pred ictors than 
purely clinical or psychopathological variables ."' 
T here is a lso a conceptua l problem with the stand ard p icture of 
the causal link, which is that an "underlying" disorder causes the 
al legedly '·symptomatic'' lega lly relevant behavior. In the case of 
many disorders po tentially linked to sexual violence. the causa l 
link is ta utol ogicall y automatic. T he necessary and sufficie nt crite -
ria for the disorder are precise ly the behaviors that are su pposed ly 
caused. and there is no evidence of an independent "underlying" 
disorder. For example , if an agent has a sufficientl y strong desire 
for .. abnormal' ' sex objects"" or other "abnormal" sexual behavior 
and causes harm by act ing on it, the agent will be dee med to be suf-
fer ing fro m a recognized and severe sexual disorder,"' but there is 
no underly ing d isorder separate from the desire and cond uct itself. 
To take another example , if an agent has a history of many signs of 
irresponsible and antisocial conduct, this will be sufficient to war-
rant the recognized diagnosis of "Antisocial Personality Disorder. "6' 
O nce again , however, there is no disorder distinct from th e behav-
ior that causes the behavior. I am not denying that there may be 
" underlying" biological, psychological, and sociological causes for 
such behavior. Indeed, there are such underlying causes for all be-
havior. I am sugges ting that there is reason to believe that for many 
personality disorders and the other types of behavioral abnormali-
ties sexual predators present, there may not be any identifi able , 
underlying, biological or functional abnormality that would gener-
''' James Bonta e t a!., The Predictio n of Crimina l and Violent Recidi vism Amo ng 
Men tall y Disord ered Offenders: A M eta-Analysis , 123 Psycho!. Bull. 123. 139 (1 998). 
"" I p lace the te rm "a bnorm al" in scare quotes because at present th e re is no 
adequate, uncontroversia l theory of the normality or abno rmalit y o f des ires. R o bert 
Nozick. The Nature of Ratio na lity 139-40 (1993) ("A t present , we have no adeq uate 
theory o f the substanti ve ratio na lity of goa ls and desires .... ' ') . Psychiat ry and 
psychol ogy arc not except ion s. Recall that, as recently as the early 1970s . psychiatric 
o rthodoxy held that a sexual prefe rence for a n adult membe r of o ne's own sex was a 
sy mptom of a psych ia tric d isorder. See Am. Psychiatric A ss 'n , Di agnost ic and 
Statistica l Manua l o f Mental Disord e rs 44 (2d eel. 1968). In 1973, th e Associa tion 
vored to exclud e ho mosexua lity per se as a recognized di so rde r. T he re had been no 
sc ientifi c o r clinical adva nces that supported the change, howeve r. Wha t changed 
we re th e va lu es of the maj ority of psychiatrists. See Stephe n J. M o rse . Crazy 
Be havior. Mora ls & Science: An Analysis of Menta l Health Law, 51 S. Ca l. L. Rev. 
527, 557- 58 (1 978) . 
" 7 DS tvl-IV-TR. supra note 50. a t 535.566- 76. 
"' lei. at 701-06. 
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ate the conc lusion that the behavior is clinically abnormal rather 
than socially deviant, immoral or the like. Finally , even if the re 
were --underl yi ng" ca uses that sat isfied a plausible definition of 
psychi atri c or psychological abnormality, it would no t mean that 
the conduct should be excused. A ll patterns of desire and conduct 
are caused by something, an abnormal cause is a lso just a cause . 
and ccwsation does not per se en ta il non-responsibility . 
Consider the application of the foregoing concep tua l fea ture of 
some psych iatric diagnoses to the case of menta ll y abnormal sexual 
Predat io n. If an agent stromdv desires and has a historv of sexucll ~ ~ ~ J 
predation, the causal link is established by definition because the 
predator is mentally abnormal by virtue of being a predator . The 
predisposing ca use , sexua l desire, and the lega lly re levant sexuall y 
violent co nduct that sat isfies the dangerousness criterion together 
also sat isfy the requirements of abnormality and a causal link . Not 
all predators who satisfy the causal link standard should be com-
mitted because many are responsible , but if the causal link 
standard is the criterion for commitment, it will always be demon-
strable. A ll sexual predation dangerous enough to justify the 
dangerousness criterion for preventive confinement will also war-
rant a diagnosis. Evaluators and trial courts could claim that not all 
predators who meet the causal link standard are committable even 
though all suffer from a serious abnormality, but on what legally 
justifiable grounds could they reach such a conclusion if the ca usal 
link is the standard? A ll sexually dangerous agents could be fo und 
to have a serious control problem. By necessity, decisionmakers 
would be imposing their own private , subj ective criteria, based, one 
assumes, on considerations of danger and perhaps non-responsibility, 
but such decisionmaking would be legally arbitrary and unaccept-
able . Limiting the causal link standard by requiring that the 
predator suffer from a recognized predisposing mental disorder 
will not sol ve the circularity problem. 
Furthermore , most of the recognized disorders that will apply in 
cases of sexual predation are not promising candidates as predi-
cates for non-responsibility. The recognized disorders that are 
likely to support a fi nding of the causal link-such as the 
parapbilias, impulse disorders generally, and personality disor-
ders-are precisely those that raise the circularity problem most 
acutely. They do so because they are marked primarily by abnor-
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malities of desire , conduct, and pervas ive behavioral or affective 
"style,"w rather than by re latively discrete , severe abnormalities of 
cognition, perception. a nd affect. '' ' In these cases, both the co nclu-
sion concerning abnorm ality and the inclusion of the conduct as 
the criteria for a recogni ze d disorde r will inevitab ly be affect ed by 
considerat ions of social co ntext and val ues in additi on to m ore 
neut ral, scientifi c, and clinica l criteria fo r abnorma lity, such as sig-
nificant dysfuncti o n or cl istress. 71 In short, it is simply harde r to 
characterize conduct and persona lity disorders as "diseases," even 
if the conduct is re latively extreme and har mful. '~ 
"Personality disorder" is a recognized category of psychiatric cli-
agnoses,n but people with perso nalit y disorders rare ly suffer on 
that basis a lone from th e types of psychotic cognition or extremely 
severe mood problems th at are th e standard touchston es for a find-
ing of non-responsibility. Most are perfectly in touch with reality, 
their instrumental rationality is intact , and they have adequate 
knowledge of the applicable moral and legal rules that apply to 
the ir conduct. '.] Although their abnormalities might m ake it harder 
,. For example, The Diagnostic and Stat istical Manual of Mental Disorde rs defines a 
personality di sorder generica ll y as '· an enduring pa ttern of inner experience and 
be havior that deviates markedly from the expectat ions of the individual's culture . is 
pervasive and inflexible, has an onse t in ado lescence o r ea rl y ad ulthood , is stab le ove r 
time , and leads to dist ress or impairme nt. " DSM-lV-TR, supra note 50, a t 685. 
'" As the text suggests . most sexually violent agents a re not motivated by psychotic 
re aso ns. Furthermore, sexual preda tor commitments will be unnecessary for sex ually 
vio le nt agents who are grossl y o ut of contact with rea lity beca use they wi ll be lega ll y 
insa ne and com mittable o n that basis . See in fra text accompany ing note 8 1. 
71 See DSl\11-IV-TR, supra note 50, at xxx- xxxi (sta ting a generic definition of mental 
abnormality). 
n As my clinical teachers taught me. most me ntal disord e rs are things th at people 
" have ," but personality disorders are what people "are. " Al tho ugh imprecise, this 
fo rmulation helps one understand why cha racterizing some of the latte r as disorders 
or diseases is difficult. 
" DSl\11-IV-TR, supra note 50. a t 685 . 
" In many cases , th e cond uct that is the basis for the diagnosis docs not per se ca use 
th e pe rson distress. For exampl e, an agent whose conduct warrants the diagnosis of 
Antisocial Personality Disorde r may be dis tressed by the reaction s of the police, 
creditors, and o thers, bu t the cond uct it se lf might no t be distressing. Similarly, many 
sexually violent predators are no t distressed by their desires, but th ey are di st ressed 
by the condemnation a nd punishment socie ty and the law impose . Moreover, the 
degree of distress or impairment such disorde rs ca use is very much a function of the 
particular social, moral , and lega l regime in which the person li ves, whi ch once aga in 
suggests th e highly value-relative nature of the judgment of disord er in these cases. 
See, e .g., Elle n Barry, Despite Thera pies, Pedophilia Eludes Cure , Boston G lobe, 
• 
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for them to behave well , they seldom manifest the grave problems 
that might satisfy an insanity defen se or even warrant a commo n-
sense excuse on the ground that the person cannot "help" himse lf 
or herse lf. Even if the term " personality disorde r" were interpreted 
broadly to include paraphilias, di so rders of impulse controL or 
o ther recognized disorders th at mi ght apply to sexual predators, 
th e term would still be over-inclusive as a predicate for non-
res ponsibility in the case of most sex uall y violent people. 
The causal link standard's general over-inclusiven ess as a non-
responsibility criterion and its circul arity problems are especially 
problematic in the criteria for commitment that Kansas and other 
states have adopted. 7' R ecall th e basic definition of a mentally ab-
normal sexual predator: "any person who has been convicted of or 
charged with a sexually violent offense and who suffers from a 
mental abnormality or personality disorder which makes the per-
son likely to engage in repeat acts of sexual violence. "7" A "mental 
abnormality" is defined as a "congenital or acquired condition af-
fecting the emotional or volitional capacity which predisposes the 
person to commit sexually violent offenses in a degree constituting 
such person a menace to the health and safety of others." 77 This ba-
sic definition requires one of two types of abnormality-personality 
disorder or mental abnormality, as Kansas defines this term-to 
satisfy the critical non-responsibility justification for involuntary 
confinement. Unless these abnormalities produce or are the 
equivalent of non-responsibility , the causal link between abnormal-
ity and predation does no legal justificatory work, and the 
definition simply describes an agent who is "caused to be" danger-
ous. After all, every dangerous agent is caused to be dangerous by 
some set of causal variables, and "caused" dangerousness alone is 
insufficient to justify involuntary commitment. Just because behav-
ior is caused does not mean that it cannot be controlled. Thus, the 
Feb . 14, 2002, at A1 (reporting that one therapist , fru st rated by the inability to change 
the motivation of pedophiles, recomme nd ed that some sho uld move to socie ti es 
where soci al and legal constraints on non-coe rcive pedophilic practices are less seve re 
th an in our soci ety); see also supra note 66 (discussing homosexuality). 
75 The Ka nsas criteria are ide ntical o r similar to those in othe r sexual pred ator 
commitment statutes. See, e.g. , Wash. Rev. Code Ann. §~ 71.09.020(1), (2) , (4) , (12) 
(West 2002) . The analysis herein of the Kansas criteria exte nds a previous treatment. 
Morse, Fea r of D anger , Flight from Culpability, supra note 5, a t 260- 61. 
" Kan. Stat. Ann . § 59-29a02(a) (Supp. 2000) . 
77 Id. ~ 59-29a02(b) . 
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terms "personality disorder" and "menta l abnormali ty" must be 
the ground for non-responsibility, in addition to being part of the 
necessarv causal link. 
0 
We have already seen that personality disorder is an over-
inclusive criterion fo r non-responsibility and is not a prom ising 
predicate for non-responsibility in any case . Therefore, let us turn 
to considerat ion of Kansas's id iosyncratic non-responsi bi li ty crite -
ri on, .. mental abnormality. " The term " mental abnorm ality" ' is not 
a recognized diagnostic term , but, as we ha ve seen.7' the Supreme 
Court in Hendricks properly noted that states are free to define le-
ga l criteria as th ey wish, and the crit er i~:1 for sexual predator 
commitments are surely legal. States consequen tly need not be 
bou nd by the criteria employed by extra-legal groups, suc h as psy-
chia trists and psychologists. T he only question is whether the 
criteria adopted are rationally calculated to achi eve a justifiable 
purpose. In this case, the justifiable purpose is to identify those 
dangerous sexual offenders who are not responsible. But "mental 
abnormality," as Kansas defines it, could not possibly sa tisfy this 
goal because it would apply to every person who is potentially 
sexually violent, whether or not the person's conduct warranted a 
recognized diagnosis. The "mental abnormality" criterion is ob-
scure , circular, and mostly incoherent. 
The definition states that a person is abnormal if any genetically 
inherited/prenatally acquired (congenital) or environmental ( ac-
quired through life experience) variable that affects the person's 
emotional or volitional ability predisposes the person to engage in 
criminal sex ual misconduct. It is not clear what is meant by "emo-
tional " or "volitional" ability. Neither word is a term o f art or a 
technical term in the behavioral or philosophical literature. T he 
former has a common sense, intuitive meaning, but the concept of 
volition is extraordinarily vexed. 79 If it refers to the ab ility of an 
agent to execute his or her intention, predators have no volitional 
'" Sec sup ra text accompa nying note 12. 
7
'' The meaning of volition is controversial in philosophy and psychology. See 
Michae l S. Moore, Act a nd Crime: The Plulosophy of Au ion and Irs l mplicarions fo r 
Criminal Law 113-65 (1993) (providing the most ex te nsive discuss io n o r vo liti o n in 
th e legal literature , criticizing th e view that volitions are desires, and a rguing that a 
vo lition is an intention to execute a basic ac tion). 
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disability whatsoe ver.''!} If it refe rs to states of desiring or wan ting, it 
is red undant with the requirement of a "predispositi on " to crimi1nl 
se xual vio lence . 
Furth e rmore , predisposing cognitive variables are evidentl y ex-
c lu clcd fro m Kansas 's definition , probably because cognitive 
oro blems :1rc rare lv fac tors in abnormalities of desi re . Jf thcv \ve rc . 
1 ..1 . ; 
as in the case of manifest delusi ons, stand ard no n-responsibil ity 
cond ition s. suc h as gross ir rationality, would obtain. For example , 
J us tice Sc<t lia ·s Crone dissent raises the hypot heti ca l case o f a man 
wi th <t will of stee l who de lusionally believes th at every woman he 
encou nters is inviting crude sexual advan ces.s1 Such an agen t wo ul d 
probably meet even a narrow, cognitive criterion fo r legal insan ity. 
In a fund amental sense, th e agent does not know what he is doing 
o r docs not know that what be is do ing is wrong because he de lu-
siona lly believes that his crude advances are justi fied by th e 
woman 's consent. T his defendant could be indefi nite ly committed 
using traditional and relatively uncontroversial post-insanity ac-
quittal commitment. Although gross cognitive impairments tend to 
be clearly identifiable and might render agents dangerous a nd non-
responsible , their exclusion from the m ental abnormality definition 
in the sexual predator criteria does not present a practical problem. 
Holding aside , then , both a clear understanding of what the stat-
ute means by emotional and volitional abilities and any 
consideration of cognitive abilities, what else would predispose any 
agent to any conduct-sexual or otherwise, normal or abnormal-
if no t biological and environmental variables that affect the agent 's 
emotional and volitional ability? In other words, the definition is 
simply a partial, generic description of the causation of a ll be hav-
ior, and it is not a limiting definition of abnormality. A ll behavior is 
(partially) caused by emotional and volitional abilities that have 
themselves been caused by congenital and acquired characteristics . 
T he condition that makes sexual predation mentally abnormal-
congenital or acquired causes of a predisposition-applies to all 
behavior and is, thus , vacuous. It certainly cannot explain why the 
inevitable presence of congenital and acquired causes of a predis-
position means that the agent cannot control and is no t responsible 
"' See Finga re tt e & Hasse , supra no te 54. at 61. 
" Ka ns<lS v. Crane, 122 S. C t. 867,875 (2002) (Scali a . J .. dissenting). 
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for action that expresses th e predisposition. Indeed, accordin g to 
this criterion, no one would ever be responsible for any conduct. 
The Kansas criterion is en ti re ly dependent on the req uirement 
of a specific predisposition to commit sexually violent offenses to 
limit the definition to sexu;:d predators , but it is not a de finiti on of 
mental abnormalit y eve n in the case of sexually violent peopl e . If 
any age nt who has a predisposition to com mit sexua l offenses is 
mentally abnormal , as the de finition impli es , then the de fini tion or 
me ntal abnormality is ci rcular, and abnormality does not in de-
pendently provide eve n part of th e necessary causal link . The 
definition presupposes what it is trying to explain. t-,.1Ioreover, such 
a circular definition collapses the cliched but important distinction 
between "badness" and ·· mad ness," which is precisely the di stin c-
tion the definition is mea nt to achieve to justify civil rather than 
criminal commitment. 
The criterion suffers from further defects. It is strange to define 
a mental abnormality by reference to the penal code. Such a refer-
ence suggests that legislative expansion or contraction of the scope 
of criminalization of sexual offenses would inherently expand or 
contract the scope of what counts as me ntally abnormal and what 
automatically satisfies the causal link. The definition also requires 
that the predisposition to sexual violence must " menace" others to 
a sufficient degree. This requirement implies that some sexually 
violent offenses might not constitute a menace to the health and 
safety of o thers. ~c But if so, why are such offenses criminalized? 
F urthermore, the degree of menace required , like the definition of 
a sexual offense, is a normative moral and legal standard. In what 
way is a normative legal standard of dan gerousness a rational part 
of the definition of mental abnormality rather than the product of 
such abnormality? 
In sum, the criteria in the Kansas statute that es tablish non-
responsibility, personality disorder, and mental abnormality, are 
" In a pe rsonal com mu ni ca tion. Sh e rry Colb points o ut tha t the ' 'd egree of m e nace" 
may refe r to the stati stica l likelihood that the predator wi ll act rather than to the harm 
the conduct will produ ce . The statutory language is ambiguous, but I think the latte r 
is the more natural readi ng. Even if it does refer to statistical risk, the amount of risk 
required is a normative, lega l issue . El ectronic Correspondence from Sherry Colb, 
Professor of Law, Ru tge rs School of Law at Newark , to Stephen J. Morse , Professor 
of Law, University o f Pe nnsylvan ia (Dec. 22. 2001) (on file with th e V irginia Law 
Review Associat ion ). 
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vast ly over-inclusive non-responsibility or control criteria, and the 
definition of mental abnorm ality is both obscure and virtually in-
coherent. The causal link standa rd in general and the Kansas 
cr iteria in particular are not non -responsibility standards. They 
cannot conceivably limit involuntary civil commitment only to 
those potential predators who ca nn ot control th emselves and are, 
thus, not responsible for their potenti al sexua l violence. Using such 
criteri a, virtually every predator would be both convictable and 
committable. T he loss of co ntrol standard should be rejec ted for 
the reasons Part III provides, but at least it a ttempts to be both a 
genuin e non-responsibility and limiti ng standard. A forti ori , and 
contrary to Justice Scalia's assertion in Crane, th e causal link stan-
dard is even less acceptable because it is not and cannot be either a 
limiting or non-responsibility standard. The causal link standard 
permits involuntary civil commitment for dangerousness alone and 
must be rejected. 
In addition to over- inclusiveness, causal link standards invite po-
tentially misleading expert testimony. The causal link be tween 
mental abnormality and legally relevant conduct is established, in 
brief, by demonstrating that the agent has an irrational reason for 
action that mental disorder produced and that the agent's irrational 
reason was at least in part a cause of the legally relevant behavior. 
The agent's reason for action and wh ether it is produced by mental 
disorder are fac tual questions; whether that reason was a cause of 
behavior within the agent's practical reason is a common-sense 
conclusion; whether that reason was evidence of sufficient lack of 
capacity for rationality to warrant an ascription of non-responsibility 
is a normative, legal qu estion . Excellent mental health clinicians can 
help to identify an agent 's mental states, including an agent 's rea-
sons for action, but they beg the responsibility question if they 
simply conclude from a causal link, as many do , that the agent can-
not control himself or is non-responsible . The problem is that, 
when disease or disorder are implicated in the causation of behav-
ior, the misleading, question-begging metaphor of mechanism-the 
thought that behavioral symptoms are simply mechanisms and not 
actions-always threatens to intrude and to predispose decision-
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makers to infer non-responsibility. '~ Thus, the causal link stan-
darers conceptual problem of over-inclusiveness will be potentiated 
in practice by expert test imony concerning disorder an d disease . 
F inal ly , ge nuinely helpful expert testimony abo ut the "mental ab-
normality '' criter ion , as Kansas defines it , is im possible because the 
criteri on is so obscure and unmoored from any sound clinical or 
scientific foundation. 
T he broader implications of the causal link standa rd are also ex-
tremely disquieting. If the causal link standa rd is constitutionally 
acceptable , the logic of Hendricks and Crnne implies that all people 
charged with or convicted of vi o lent offenses who have some men-
tal abnormality that predisposes them to commit those offenses arc 
potentially committable. T his would still be true if an adequate, 
non-circular definition of mental abnormality were provided be-
ca use even then a causa l link does not entail non-responsibility. 
T he problem would be exacerbated if the Ka nsas definition of 
"mental abnormality" were accepted. All pred ispositions to com-
mit offenses would satisfy Kansas's causal link between mental 
abnormality and legally relevant behavior because all predisposi-
tions to commit legally relevant behavior are seriously abnormal. 
Suppose, for example, that a state wished to apply an involun-
tary commitment law to a class of dangerous people broader than 
sexual predators, such as "mentally abnormal violent predators. " 
Using the Kansas definition of a sexual predator as a model and 
making on ly two changes-omitting the two references to sex-the 
definition of a violent predator would be this: "any person who has 
been convicted of a violent offense and who suffers from a mental 
abnormality or personality disorder which makes the person likely 
to engage in the repeat acts of violence." Othe rwise, let us assume , 
the statute is indistinguishable from the Kansas statute , except that 
it gives a more adequate definition of mental abnormality. Other 
than its scope of application, this statute is conceptually and legally 
indistinguishable from the Kansas commitment statute that passed 
constitutional muster in Hendricks. Depending in part on how 
broadly or narrowly the "violent offenses" criterion was interpreted ,~4 
·' ' The metaphor of mechani sm is discussed in more de tail a t infra tex t accompanying 
notes 87- 88. 
' ' for exa mple , the Supre me Co urt has previously been untro ubled by using the 
threa t o f a re latively min o r property crime as the predicate for a findin g o f 
I 
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i ~ would permit the indefinite involuntary civil commitment of an 
immense proportion of criminals who would otherwise be sen-
tenced to pri son or released after serving a full prison term. For 
example, large numbers of people in prison, especially males, meet 
the diagnos tic cri teria for Antisocial Personality D isorder."' Indeed , 
conduct tha t vio lates th e penal code is precise ly the type of cond uct 
th at justifies the d iagnos is. Sati sfying the causal link sta nda rd for 
commi tmen t wo uld present little pro blem in such cases, threaten-
ing li berty broad ly. The Crane maj ority was cogn izant of this 
problem and imposed an independen t contro l criterion to avoid it."'' 
For the reasons this Essay gives, however, T do ubt that the inde-
pendent contro l criterion will be an adequate prophylactic. 
I recognize that our society seems specia ll y to fear sexual vio-
lence and that , at present, the motivation to create broad civil 
commitment schemes to confine violent criminals generally may 
not exist. The lack of such motivation is a historically contingent 
fact , however, ra ther than a principled objection. Thus, causal link 
standards represent a real and persistent threat to liberty. 
The causal link standard is a potentially profound, broad threat 
to li berty, to the distinction between crime and disorder, and to the 
consequent distinction between civil and criminal confinement. As 
Crane correctly recognized, the causal link standard does not sat-
isfy substantive due process. In the future, courts should not be 
blinded by necessarily non-substantive, cosmetic changes in causal 
link commitment criteria that appear to embrace a serious control 
problem. Substantive due process should require a genuinely limit-
dange rousness to support continued involuntary commit ment of a person acqu itted 
by reaso n of insanity. See Jo nes v. U ni ted S ta tes, 463 U.S. 354,365 (1983) . 
'' David T. Lykkcn , The Antisocial Personalities 4-6 (1995); Vernon L. Q uinsey et 
a l.. Violent Offenders: Appra isi ng and Managing Risk 75- 76 (1998) (no ting a lso that 
almost all prisone rs have some diagnosable menta l disorder). But see Lee N. Robin s 
et a l.. A nt isocia l Personality, in Psychia tri c Diso rde rs in America: The epidemiologic 
Carchmenr Area Study 258, 260-61 (Lee N. Robins & D arre l A. R egier eds., 1991) 
(finding th at only a minority of arres ted persons met criter ia for anti-social 
pe rsonali ty) . 
'" E.g., Kansas v. Crane, 534 U.S . 407, 122 S. Ct. 867, 870 (2002) (not ing that 40 to 60 
percent of the male prison population may be diagnosed as having Antisocial Personality 
D iso rder). Commenta tors have a lso recognized th e implicat ions. See, e.g ., Mara Lynn 
Kronga rd, A Popul at ion at Risk: Civi l Commitmen t of Substance Abusers After 
Kansas v. Hendricks, 90 Ca l. L. Rev. 111 (2002) (claiming gener al ly that Hendricks 
unjustifiably broade ned the scope of civil commitme nt and that substa nce abusers as a 
class arc a t specific risk for commitment) . 
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ing and workable non-respo nsibility standard as a predicate for in-
voluntary civil commi tmen t. T he next Part suggests tha t a 
ge nuinely independent contro l standard appears to sa tisfy the non-
responsibility condition, as Crone held , bu t th at this stanclmcl is 
sca rce ly more conce ptu all y sa ti sfactory or workable than a pure 
ca usa l link standard . 
III ... UNCONTRO LLA BLE URGES " 
It is common to say of people that they generally lack se lf-
control or that they los t contro l on a specific occasion. Depending 
on th e circumstances and th e applicable moral and legal standard 
imposed, such locuti ons are used both to ascribe blam e and to ex-
cuse the agent. In the case of Leroy H endri cks, fo r example, the 
criminal justice sys tem b lamed and punished him for yielding to hi s 
a llegedly uncontrollable urges; the sexual predator commitment 
system in effect excused him, found him non-responsible , because 
it committed him on the ground that he could not control precisely 
the same urges and rela ted co nduct that led to the ten-year prison 
sentence for sexual molestati on that preceded his commitment. But 
how could it be fair to hold responsible and punish an agent fo r 
yielding to urges that are impossible or suprem ely difficult to con-
trol? This Part of the Essay claims that our ambivalence about 
control problems is caused by a confused understanding of the na-
ture of those problems and argues that control or volitional 
problems should be abandoned as legal criteria. On conceptual and 
scientific grounds, loss o f control , as usually understood, is not an 
adequate limiting, non-responsibility standard for involuntary civil 
commitment. On practica l gro unds, it will impose almost no limit 
on commitment. 
Let us begin with the phenomenology of an alleged control 
problem. Suppose that a person has a powerful desire to do some-
thing that it is unwise, immoral, or illegal.s7 That is, the agent really, 
really, really wants to do something wrong. Imagine an agent with 
extremely strong sexual desires who is in a situation of great temp-
ta tion. Hold constant the agent 's subjective strength of desire and 
temptation in the foll owing scenarios. If the situation is the privacy 
" Other terms might be substituted for " desire," such as "urge ," " impulse," or 
·'wa nt ," but, fo r all p ractica l purposes. they are synonymous in thi s context. 
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of the bedroom with one' s consenting spouse, t he agent is lucky, 
and there is no problem o f wisdom, moralit y. o r legality. But sup-
pose that the other is a willing stranger. but neithe r has the means 
to engage in protected sex . O r suppose th a t th e age nt is in a hote l 
roo m with the willing spo use of <m oth er. F ina ll y. suppose th at the 
age nt is Leroy H e ndri cks , in th e co mpa ny of a n a ttract ive child. 
In all four cases the age nt intense ly desires to have sex, bu t why 
mi ght we conclude that any o r th e m is not res po nsi ble fo r hi s or her 
sexual be havior? ln the latte r three cases the pe rson had a good 
pract ical, moral , or legal reason not to engage in sex, but the 
strength of the desire was by hypothesis the sa me in all four cases . 
Sexual desires , like all desires, might be produced by genetic pre-
di sposition, by sociali zat ion expe riences, by part icul ar situations, or 
by a hos t o f o ther ca uses, but a desire is simply a desire , however it 
is produced. D esires a nd te mpta tions, whe ther " no rmal" or " ab-
normal," may be strong or weak, persistent o r sudden. It is of 
co urse easier, in th e coll oqui al sense, to be have wi sely , morally, 
and legally if an agent does not have suddenly ari sing, strong de-
sires to behave unwisely, immorally, or illegally. Moreover, failure 
to sa tisfy strong desires can cause very unpleasa nt fe elings, such as 
tension , anxiety , and frustrati on. Nonetheless , what does it mean to 
say that an agent "can ' t help it " when the age nt yields to strong de-
sires that will cause unpleasant feelings if they are not satisfied? 
If an agent's body is lite rally forced to move , say, by operation of 
a genuine reflex, then the agent , for legal purposes, has not acted at 
all , because the law's concept of action requires in tentional bodily 
movement. Conduct caused by strong desi res, however, is surely 
human action and no t a bi ophysical mech anism. Note, too , that the 
strength of the desire, and no t its normality o r abnormality, is what 
mo tiva tes the conclusion that perhaps the agent cannot help him-
self. The alleged abnormality of a des ire is no t a proxy for its 
stre ngth. A fter all , we would not conclude tha t an agent who yields 
to a weak desire cannot he lp himself, even if the desire is abnor-
mally caused or abnormal in itself. 
In the examples, the agent 's instrumental practical reason seems 
entirely unimpaired. The agent strongly desires sex, a desire that is 
bo th common and easy to understand, and believes that sexual 
co ntact with an available o ther will satisfy the desire . So, the agent 
fo rms the intention to have sex and acts on the intention. When 
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Leroy H endricks 's hand alights on the body of a chi ld , that effect is 
not simply a neuromuscular spasm, and it is instrumentally rati onal 
in light of Hendricks 's desires and beliefs . Furthermore. virtua lly 
all age nts who yield to strong and even sudden or surprising desires 
to behave unwi sely, immorally, or illega ll y ful ly recognize. as Leroy 
Hendricks adm it tedly did, that yie lding is wrong. Eve n if th e con-
duct is the symptom of a recognize e! di so rder, agen ts who yie ld in 
such circumsta nces appear quintessenti all y respons ible for their 
cond uct. ft is non e th eless o ft en claimed that th ey ·'co ul dn't he lp it " 
and should therefore be excused or treated as non-responsible. 
Two doctrin es in criminal law negate responsibility because the 
agent a ll egedly acted "involuntarily": the absence of an act and 
comp ulsion or duress. Let us consider whether eithe r legal mean-
ing of '' involuntariness," which seems to be synonymo us with lack 
of capacity to control oneself, can help us understand what we 
mean conceptually by loss of control. An agent is clearly not even 
prima facie responsible, unless the agent's harmful bodily move-
ments are intentional actions. Even if an agent acts intentionally, 
he wi ll be held non-responsible if he acts in response to compulsion 
or duress, because he has been placed in a hard choice situation. 
We could not fairly hold him accountable for yie lding to a suffi-
cient threat. 
In the case of no action , the bodily movement is literally in vol-
untary, literally a mechanism, because it is caused by something 
other than the agent's practical reason that produces an intention. 
In the case of duress, however, involuntariness is both metaphori-
cal and a legal labe l affixed to agents who are co nsidered non-
responsible. In either case , if the agent causes harm, we conclude 
that the agent co uld not help it, and we hold her non-respons ible. 
Again, in the case of no action, the agent litera ll y could not help it. 
In the case of duress, she could help it , but we cannot fairly expect 
her to help it , and thus we say, metaphorically, that she could not 
and ascribe non-responsibility. Can either theory explain loss of 
controi, as this standard is used, when evaluating th e responsibility 
of sexual predators? 
I bel ieve that the metaphor of mechanism is the most misleading 
so urce of the intuition that some people cannot control some de-
sires, especially if we believe that the desires are produced by 
neurochemical or other brain abnorm al ities. T hi s mechanistic meta-
• 
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phor is powerful because mechanistic events are not proper objects 
of responsibili ty ascription. T hus, if action tha t ·· yields '' to a strong 
''abnormal" desire is "just like" a bioph ys icall y involuntary bodily 
movement. th en yielding is apparently not responsible act ion. T his 
is simpl y an analogy, however, and it is flmved. Reca ll that a desire 
is si mply a desire. whe ther it is caused by biological abnormalities 
or the alignment of the planets. There is no literal physi cal compul-
sion. as there is in cases of reflex , spasm, and the like . lt is litera ll y 
true tha t an <igcnt cannot help a reflexive bodily movement, but is 
it true that an agent cannot help acti ng to sati sfy at leas t some 
strong desires in some situations? 
To cash out the mechanistic metaphor, examples of the follow-
ing kind are given.'' Assume that an agent needs to urinate, but is 
unable to find an appropriate place to do so . As time passes and 
the bladder continues to fill, the desire to urinate will become in-
creasingly powerful and unpleasant. At some point , however, the 
person's bladder will empty because the pressure on the urethral 
(urinary) sphincter will mechanically force it to open; he or she will 
no longer be able to "hold it in," no matter what the cost might be 
for doing so. For example, suppose the agent is threatened with 
death for permitting his bladder to empty. The agent will surely 
exercise control for a very lengthy period, but all agents will finally 
empty their bladders because, ultimately, voiding will be a product 
of litera lly uncontrollable mechanism. The sphincter "fails" be-
cause the physical pressure on it is too great. 
Strong desires are allegedly analogous to the full bladder. In-
creasing desire is analogized to increasing pressure on the sphincter, 
and we are supposed to conclude that people are no more responsi-
ble for yielding to some desires than they are fo r emptying their 
bladders. But desires are not physical forces, actions are not 
mechanisms, and people are not sphincters. There are no "desire 
units" that will finally m echanistically force the "action switch" to 
flip if enough "desire units" are added. Assuming that Leroy 
Hendricks wants to live, if we threaten him with immediate death 
"' Th is specifi c exa mple was first suggested by an anonymo us participant at a 
confe re nce . O ne can e ndlessly devise such exa mples. See, e .g. , Stephen J. Morse, 
Hooked on Hype: Add iction and Responsibili ty, 19 L. & Phil. 3. 28- 30 (2000) . 
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for touching a child, he will not touch a child. '~ The analogy to lit-
eral mechanism fai ls, but if the mechanistic picture is in one's head , 
it is easy to conclude that the sexual predator cannot control him-
self. 
Now let us consider whether a compulsion or duress theory can 
explain the conclusion that some agents who suffer from intense 
and allegedly abnormal desires cannot control themselves. Assume 
that an agent is being threatened with a horrible death unless he 
kills two people. At some point, it will seem almost impossible not 
to yield to the threat. Almost any agent might yield, no matter 
what the cost might be for doing so. 
Duress is an excuse to crime only if an agent is threatened wi th 
death or grievous bodily harm, a person of reasonable firmness 
would yield in the situation, and the agent is not at fault for placing 
herself in the threatening situation.'~' Thus, we might finally excuse 
the agent but not because the agent had a volitional or control 
problem. Again, the agent's reasoning is intact, and his will, his vo-
lition,~~ operates effectively to save his life by forming and acting on 
the intention to kill the hapless victims. The reason to excuse the 
agent would be that he faced a dreadfully hard choice for which he 
'"See Judith V. Becker & John A. Hunter, Jr. , Evaluation of Treatment Outcome 
for Adult Perpetrators of Child Sexual Abuse, 19 Crim. Just. & Behav. 74, 82 (1992) 
(noting that probation and its supervision are effective in reducing "atypical" sexual 
conduct). Becker and Hunter also report other research indicating that sexual 
offenders commit many more sexual offenses than those for which they arc arrested. 
This too suggests that sexual offenders are able to "control themselves" when the risk 
of apprehension is substantial. 
What reasons would have motivational salience in an individual case is of course an 
open question, and individual agents will respond to different reasons. For example. 
drug addicted pregnant women who will not otherwise forego drugs are more likely to 
remain abstinent and to attend full day treatment if they are paid regularly with a 
voucher system to do so. See, e.g., Hendrcc E. Jones et al. , The Effectiveness of 
Incentives in Enhancing Treatment Attendance and Drug Abstinence in Methadone-
Maintained Pregnant Women, 61 Drug & Alcohol Dependence 297 (2001 ). The point 
is simply that the actions of sexual offenders are actions, not mechanisms, and thus 
potentially reason-responsive. 
The example in the text might also suggest that if it takes a gun to one 's head to 
motivate a person not to engage in certain actions, then it must be very hard not to 
perform those actions. Again , this is, in a colloquial sense, best explained in terms of a 
rationality defect, as Part IV explains, but it docs not mean that there is anything 
wrong with the agent's will. 
"'Model Penal Code§ 2.09(1) (1985). 
'" Sec Moore, supra note 79. at 113- 65. 
I 
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is not responsible, and we co uld not fa irly expect him not to yield 
when threatened wi th death. 
The agent face d with the threat of fru stration of strong internal 
desires is essentia ll y claiming an '' inte rn al du ress '' excuse . But is 
th e frustration o f desire the equi va lent o f the experience of dea th , 
grievous bodil y harm, or agonizing pain? U nl ike the literal in-
voluntariness of mechanism, the me taphorical in vo luntariness of 
duress is a cont inuum concept. Frust rat ion an d re lated unpleasant 
feeling sta tes may be psycho logicall y pa inful , but eve n if the desire 
and its strength are not the agent 's fa ult , th ink how much psycho-
logical pain must be threaten ed to conside r an age nt not 
responsible for sexual vio lence . Note , furth er. th at if the agent 's 
pr imary reason for yie lding is the positive pursuit of pleas ure 
ra ther than the avo idance of threa tened psychological pain , then 
there is no hard choice and " internal duress" would not obtain. 
If non-culpable hard choice is the reason why we might excuse 
some agents who yield to strong internal desires , this non-
responsibility condition wo uld be rare in general and in the case of 
sexual predators in particular. Almost all agents predisposed to 
yield to strong desires to do wrong, especially serious wrongs like 
sexual violence , would be considered responsibl e because the 
threat of psychological pain will seldom be sufficiently great to ex-
cuse . A nd again , even if we did excuse agents fo r this reason in 
some cases, there is no contro l defect. The agent' s will operates ef-
fectively indeed to end the psych ological pain by satisfying the 
desire . The non-responsibili ty conditi o n, if one obtains a t all , 
would be a sufficiently hard choice th e agent faces through no fa ult 
of her own. 
Loss of control as a non-responsibility condi tion is a colloquial 
concept that gains undeserved credibility when it is analogized to 
" involuntariness" caused by mechanism or most cases of duress. 
Nonetheless, is there a res idual, common sense meaning of loss of 
control that makes sense? H uman beings can be subject to strong 
desires that leave them feeling subj ectively unfree and that appear 
to have coercive motiva tional force. Indeed , in many cases, the de-
sires or urges may be experienced as "ego-alien," as if they were 
being imposed on the agent rather th an being p art of the agent. It 
is surely harder to behave well when one has strong desires to do 
wrong because the prospect of satisfaction is so pleasant , the pros-
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pect of frustration is so painful, and the combination of these pros-
pects te nds to diminish our ability to be able to bring reason to 
bear about what we should do. But desires and fears of frustration 
and related feeling states are once again not physical forces that 
litera!lv force one 's bodv to move if thev reach sufficient intensi tv. 
- .) • .J 
They work through the agent's practical reason. ~ ' Part IV explains 
that loss of control is much better understood as a rationality prob-
lem than as a volitional defect. 
Los:; of control, as an independent state or condition that un-
dermines responsibility, does not gain much support from related 
scientific or clinical data. Loss of control is not a technical term, 
but empirical research concerning addictions , impulses , impulsivity, 
and di5orders of impulse control is probably the most re levant to 
the legal meaning of loss of control. In basic and clinical science , 
however, there is no consensus about the conceptual meaning, the 
definition, or the measurement of these terms.93 Some definitions 
are simply question-begging about the agent's ability to control his 
or her conduct. For example, the American Psychiatric Association 
defines the "essential feature" of an impulse control disorder as, 
" the failure to resist an impulse, drive, or temptation to perform an 
act that is harmful to the person or to others. "94 But why does the 
person fai l to resist, and is the reason one that suggests that the 
person is not responsible for the failure? The Diagnostic and Sta-
tistical Manual of Mental Disorders explains further: "[T]he 
individual feels an increasing sense of tension or arousal before 
,. Most self-control mechanisms we use to control the untoward effects of our 
desires arc techniques that facilitate the use of reason, prevent us from acting when 
we act '·unthinkingly," or prevent us from being in situations in which we recognize 
that we act unthinkingly. 
'
1
' E.g., Morse, supra note 88, at 8 (noting that there is no consensus definition of 
"addiction"); James D. A. Parker & R. Michael Bagby, Impulsivity in Adults: A 
Critical Review of Measurement Approaches, in Impulsivity: Theory, Assessment. 
and Treatment 142, 142 (Christopher D. Webster & Margaret A. Jackson eels., 1997) 
(stating that there is no consensus definition of impulse and describing the low 
correlation between various research measures of impulsivity). 
'!' DSM-IV-TR. supra note 50, at 663. Examples of such disorders include 
pyromania. kleptomania, and pathological gambling. The primary mental disorders 
sexual predators have-paraphilias and Antisocial Personality Disorder-are not 
specifically categorized as disorders of impulse control , but. like substance 
dependence and abuse, they share many features with disorders of impulse control. 
lei. 
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committ ing the act and then experi e nces pleasure, grati ficct tion, or 
re lief at the tirne of committ ing the act. Following th e act the re 
may or may not be regre t, sel f-re proach , or guilt. ,.,, B ut does the 
presence of increasing tensio n or arousai m ean tha t the agent can-
not cont ro l hi mse lf. and can we validly measure such states and the 
supposed loss of contra !? 
In this general area of research , good obj ective me ::tsures or the 
operative te rms. such as tension and arousa l, often d o not exist, 
and thus m ake valid empirical research impossib le . l'v1e asures with 
some apparent validi ty ofte n do not corre late. In a crude . com mon-
sense fas hion , \Ve can estimate the strength of a desire by observing 
how much the age nt is willing to sacrifice to sa tisfy it, bu t this is a 
far cry from a repeatabie, objective, independe nt measure of 
strength of desire.w' Even when the resea rch is good . in the a bsence 
of a successful account of "uncontrollability," re search canno t tell 
us whether failure to resist is "controllable" because the research 
concerns human action and not mechanisms.~7 This research does 
no t investigate how m a ny "desire units" are necessary mechani-
cally to flip the " action switch." 
I am not making the unjustifiably skeptical claim that good re-
search has taught us nothing in the domain of behaviora l control. 
Indeed , we know a great deal about the variables that contribute to 
what Professor Thomas Schelling memorably describes as the " in-
timate contest for self-command."9x For example , all things being 
equal , agents who discount time steeply or who are reward-
"' Id. 
" See Dennis M. D onovan. Assessment of Addictive Behaviors: Implications of an 
E merging Biopsychosocial Model , in Assessment o f Addictive Behaviors 3, 6 (Dennis 
M. Donovan & G. Alan Marlatt eels. , 1988) . 
'11 There have been a tt empts to measure loss of control directly. but these efforts 
have bee n question-begging failures because they circularly includ e loss o f control as 
o ne of th e criteria for the in ab ility to control oneself. See Stephen J. Morse. From 
Siko ra to Hendricks: Mental Disorder and Crimin al Responsibility, in The Evolution 
o f Mental Hea lth Law 129, 161- 62 (Lynda E. Frost & Richard J. Bonnie eels., 2001) . 
. ,, Thom as C. Schelling, Cho ice and Consequen ce 57 (1 984 ). See gene rally G eorge 
A inslie . Breakdown of Will (2001 ) (applying hyperbo lic di sco unting th eory to 
problems of willpowe r and loss of control and claiming tha t defects of the will are 
di stingui shabl e from ra tionality defec ts) ; Albert Bandura , Self-Efficacy: The Exe rcise 
o r Control (1997) (providing a n ove rview of the fi e ld and a prese ntation of "se lf-
efficacy .. theory); Howard R achlin, The Scie nce of Self-Co ntrol (2000) (providing a 
review of resea rch and a th eo retica l account of self-control base d on '·te leol ogical 
be ha vio ri sm " ). 
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insensitive are more like ly to be have wrongly than agents who dis-
count time shallowly or who are reward-sensitive. Unfortunately, 
however , we have no scientific measure o f wh ether, ultimately, an 
agent can control himse lf, and rational capacity defects are the 
variables that, in most cases, cause an agent to find it difficult to 
control himse lf.99 lt was precisely fo r these types of reaso ns , for ex-
ample. that durin g the ferment of insanity defense reform in the 
early 1980s, the American Psychiatri c Association recommended 
abolition of the contro l or volitional prong of the insanity cle-
f
, \()t l 
ens e . 
Even if there were such independent e ntiti es as irresistible de-
sires, which I deny, we cannot di stingui sh between an irresistible 
des ire and one s imply not resisted . I fully believe Leroy Hendricks 
when he reports that he subjectively feels that his urges are "un-
controllable," and experiencing some urges as ego-alien may seem 
to increase those urges ' coercive motivational salience. 101 Neverthe-
less, despite the honesty of subj ective reports of alleged 
uncontrollability, we do not know whe ther this is objectively the 
case. Such subjective feelings, however honest they may be, cannot 
substitute for conceptual and empirical demonstrations that people 
genuinely cannot control themselves. 
Loss of control as a non-responsibility condition is so conceptu-
ally unclear and empirically unresolved that it invites unhelpful , 
potentially misleading, and conclusory expert testimony when it is 
raised. All too often, "expert" opinions about whether an agent 
was capable of self-control are based on a purely common-sense 
evaluation that anyone could perform, informed implicitly or ex-
plicitly by the expert's private, subj ective moral view about 
''''Se c H.L.A. Hart , Punishment and Responsibility: Essays in the Philosophy of Law 
32-33 (1968) (explaining that the criminal la w is much more cautious about granting, 
excusing, or mitigating conditions based on " defects of the will" than on "defect of 
knowledge" because th e former are vaguer and more subjective). 
wu Am. Psychiatric Ass'n Insanity D ef. Work Group, Statement on the Insanity 
D efense, reprinted in 140 Am. J. of Psychiatry 681- 88 (1983). The American Bar 
Association reached the same conclusion for the same reason. Am. Bar Ass 'n , ABA 
Criminal Justice Mental Health Standards 330, 339-42 (1984). 
101 The crucial term in the add iction literatu re to describe such feelings is 
"compulsive" or "craving." See, e .g., Alan I. Leshner, A ddiction is a Brain Disease, 
and It Matters, 278 Sci. 45, 46 (1997). But see Morse, supra note 88, at 4-19 
(questioning the preceding cle fini tion). 
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whether the agent sho uld be held responsible . They are clearly not 
based on expert. scient ifically, or clinically grounded understand-
ings or measurements of la ck of control. Moreover, such experts 
are usually mental health professionals who almost always support 
their opinions with diagnoses of diso rder or dise ase, thus facilitat -
ing the misleading metaphor of and analogy to mec hani sm. After 
a ll , diseases are mec hani sms. '0/e do not hold mali gnant cells re-
sponsible for metast as izing, and we do not hold people with cance r 
responsible for failin g to prevent metastas is. As we have seen. 
however, human action is no t pure mechanism , even if it is the 
symptom of a disorder. but expert testimony inadvertently blurs 
this crucial distincti on. The loss of control standard , therefore , has 
the further defect of permitting, and even encouraging, unhelp ful 
and potentially misleading expert tes timony. 
The criminal justice system is the appropriate mechanism for 
control of responsible preda tors. Agents who are not responsible 
for their predatory sexual violence may properly be confined in-
voluntarily, but such a massive deprivation of liberty should be 
inflicted only on those predators who are genuinely not responsi-
ble. The difficulty is defining the criteria for non-responsibility. 
Even if a state seems to impose a genuinely independent, serious 
lack of control problem criterion, as Crane requires, the definition 
of such a problem is so inevitably amorphous that this criterion will 
impose no practical limit on abnormal sexual predator commit-
ments. Mental health professionals will have no difficulty adjusting 
their expert testimony to support the conclusion that virtually any 
sexually violent offender meets the serious lack of control stan-
dard. Moreover, there is nothing in the language of Hendricks and 
Crane that would permit an appellate judge to overturn a jury ver-
dict of serious loss of control, except, perhaps, in extreme, obvious 
cases. 11 12 Loss of control as an independent non-responsibility condi-
tion simply will not suffice on conceptual, scientific, and practical 
grounds. 
1" ' Such cases would probably be marked by an all eged predator's hi sto ry that is 
entirely inconsis tent with a colloquial control proble m and by patently deficient 
expert testimony. I assume, however, that such cases would be rare, especially if there 
were a history of sexual predation. 
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lV. LACK OF RATIONAL CAPACITY: A LlMITlNG AND YVORKAB LE 
N ON-RESPONSIBILITY STt\ NDARD 
This Part argues that the lack of the capacity for ra t ional ity is the 
ce ntral and normatively proper non-re sponsibility criteri o n in both 
iaw and ord inary morality. 1t can be applied wor k: abl y and fa irly 
an d lec\ves room fo r moraL politi caL an d legal debate about the 
appropriate: limi ts on responsibility. The "control" language used 
in Hendricks. Crone, and other cases a nd sta tutes is m etaphorical 
and be tter understood in terms of rationa lit y defects . H uman be-
ings contro l them selves by using their reaso n. If the y cann o t use 
the ir reaso n, it is very difficult to be have properly . No logical o r le -
ga l reason prevents a court from unders tanding and interpre ting 
"control" p robl ems as rationality defects. Indeed, Crane's invita-
tion to the sta tes to find emotional or cognitive sources of control 
problems suggests a potentially broad understanding of lack of con-
tro l. 
Lack of capacity for rationality is almost always the most 
straightforward explanation of why we colloquially say that some 
people cannot control themselves when they experience intense 
desires. More important, it is a genuine and limiting condition of 
non-responsibility rather than a metaphoric ground . B oth deci-
sionmakers and experts would understand the issues and their 
tasks more clearly if lack of capacity for rationality were the stan-
dard in sexual predator commitment cases. At least some potentially 
sexually violent people may indeed lack substantial capacity for ra-
tionality when confronted with persistent , inte nse sexual desires. If 
so, they are not responsible for their sexual conduct , and they may 
justifiably be involuntarily committed if future violence can be 
predicted with sufficient accuracy. 
If we consider the legal and moral standa.rds of responsibility 
most broadly, it is clear that the capacity for rationality is the pri-
mary criterion and that the lack of such capacity is the foundational 
criterion for non-responsibility. Only Jack of rationality can explain 
the diverse conditions that undermin e responsibility, including, 
among others, infancy, mental disorder , dementia , and extrem e 
stress or fatigue. F or example, children do not become more re-
sponsible as they mature simply because they grow older, taller, or 
heavier; they become more responsible because an increase in the 
capacity for rationality , including its emotional component , accom-
• 
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panics normal de ve lopment through chilclhoocl and adolescence . 
Mental disord er , dementia, and extreme stre ss do not t urn pe ople 
into aut omatons or mechanisms. Such conditi ons. for which th e 
age nt is genera lly no t responsible, undermin e the capacity for ra-
tionalit y. 
In lavv and mora lity , when a person make.; a pl ·ca for rn itigati on 
or excuse from the ordinary consequences of be havio r. th e agent is 
virtuall y a lways cl <:timing that his or he r capacity for n tt ionality vvas 
non-culpably undermin ed in the context in iss ue. \:V hcn the law 
considers civil and criminal standards of co mpt:t c nce- such as 
compete nce to contract or competence to stand tri ai--Dr crimi na l 
standards of responsibility-such as the insanity defe nse or "dimin-
ished capacity"-the underlying reason for non-responsibi lity th at 
justifies such rules is the lack of capacity for rati onal ity. Indeed , as 
I a rgue below, if one examines closely most cases of a lleged " loss 
of control," they essentially raise claims that, for som e reason , the 
agent could not " think straight" or bring reason to bear under the 
circumstances. 
Brief reflection on the concept of the person that law and moral-
ity employ and on the nature of law and morality suggests that the 
capacity for rationality must be the central condition of responsibil-
ity. What distinguishes human beings from the rest of the natural 
world is that we are endowed with the capacity for re ason , the ca-
pacity to use moral and instrumental reasons to guide our conduct. 1111 
For adults , the capacity for rationality is the quintessential condi-
tion of mental "normality," and the lack of the capacity for 
rationality is the quintessential condition of "me ntal abnormality. " . 
Law guides human conduct by giving citizens prudential and moral 
reasons for conduct. Law would be powerless to achieve its pri-
mary goal of regulating human interaction if it did no t operate 
"'' See John R. Searle. E nd of the Revolution , N.Y. R ev. of Books. Feb. 28, 2002 , at 
33 . Professor Sea rl e writes: 
Once we have the possibility of explaining particular fo rms o r human behavi or 
as fo llowing rules, we have a very rich explanatory appara tus th a t diffe rs 
drama tically from the explanatory appara tus o f the na tural sc ie nces. When we 
say we are following rules, we are accepting the notion of me nta l causation and 
the a tt endant notions of ra tionality and existence of no rms .... The content of 
th e rule does not just describe wh at is happening bu t pl ays a part in making ir 
/zap pen. 
Id . a t 35. 
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through the practical reason of the agents it addresses and if agents 
were not capable of rationally understanding the rules and their 
app licat ion under the circumstances in which the agent acts. 1"-l 
Responsibility is a normative condition that law and morality at-
tribute on ly to human beings. 'vVe do no t ascribe respo nsibility to 
inanim ate na tural forces or to other species. Holding an agent re-
sponsible means simply that it is fair to require the agent to sat isfy 
mora l and lega l ex pectations and to bear th e conseq uences if he o r 
she does not do so; holding an agent no n-respo nsibl e means simpl y 
that we do not be li eve the age nt was capable in th e context in qu es-
tion of sa ti sfyin g moral and legal expectations. The central reaso n 
why an agent might not be able to be guided by moral and lega l 
expectations is that the agent was not capable of be ing guided by 
reason. Again, it is not a condition of responsibility that an agent 
was guided by reason or acted rationally in a given situation. It is 
sufficient if the agent retained the capacity for rationality. 
Lack of compulsion or lack of duress is also a condition of re-
sponsibility, and compulsion or duress are non-responsibility 
conditions. Compulsion and duress do not excuse because the 
agent lacks the capacity for rationality. They excuse because the 
agent is placed in an extremely hard choice situation through no 
fault of her own , and we beli eve that it is not fair to ask the agent 
to bear the ordinary consequences for yielding to a threat. If the 
situation of compulsion or duress is so deranging that it renders the 
agent irrational , th en the core irrationality criterion of non-
responsibility will obtain. Most duress standards in civil and crimi-
'""See Sco tt J. Sh apiro , Law. M oral ity, and the G uidance of Conduct , 6 Legal 
Theory 127 (2000). Thi s view assumes tha t la w and morality are suffi cie ntly knowab le 
to guide conduct. but a contrary ass umption is la rge ly incohe ren t. As Professor 
Shapiro writ es: 
Legal ske pticism is an absurd doctrine. It is abs urd because the law cann ot be 
th e sort or thing tha t is unknowable. If a sys tem of norms were unknowab le, 
the n that system would not be a legal syste m. One important reason wh y the 
law must be k nowable is that its function is to guide conduct. 
Id at 131. 
As Professo r John Searl e put it: "One condition of rule-guided explanations is that 
the rul es have to be the so rts of things that one could actually follow." Searle . supra 
note L03. at 35 . 
I clo not ass ume th a t lega l rules are a lways clea r and thus capable of precise ac tion 
guidance. If most rul es in a lega l syste m were not sufficie ntly clea r most of the tim e, 
howeve r, the system could no t function. 
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nal law are extremely limited and do not apply in the vast majority 
of cases in which an agent asks to be excused from the ordinary 
consequences of behavior. 
Law and morality consistentl y use the lack of capaci ty for reason 
as the central non-responsibility criteri on. It is a thoroughly famil-
iar standard that is applicabl e in a wide variety of legal , moral, an d 
everyday contexts. The ordinary. common-sense notion of rati onal-
ity we use is a congeries of abilities , including the ability to perceive 
relatively accurate ly . to reason instrumentally , to evaluate one's ac-
tions in the light o r reasons. to weigh appropria te considerations , 
and the like. It <llso includes the capacity to feel appropriate emo-
tional responses and to use those emotions to decide what one has 
reason to do. 
No consensual, technical definition of the capacity for rationality 
exists in law, morality, philosophy, or the behavioral sciences, but 
this does not compel the conclusion that the law should abandon 
the common sense , everyday understanding of the capacity for ra-
tionality that we all apply routinely and successfully in the ordinary 
course of daily affairs, including in moral evaluation. One need not 
await a consensual definition of rationality from philosophers, 
economists, or psychologists to recognize that young children and 
people suffering from delusions suffer from major rationality de-
fects and, therefore, are not responsible for some behaviors. One 
may also, without a consensual definition of rationality, understand 
that people under severe stress usually cannot reason as well as 
they can when they are not stressed and perhaps should be par-
tially excused for improper behavior. Indeed, successful human 
interaction and flourishing would be impossible if people were 
generally unable to understand the practical reasoning of others 
and to make assessments of the capacity for rationality. In contrast , 
as Part III implies, although we also talk colloquially about and 
appear to have an everyday understanding of loss of control, we do 
not, in fact, have a good understanding of what we mean by lack of 
control; successful human interaction does not depend on success-
fully assessing control capacity. Rationality assessment is crucial to 
human existence; control assessment is not. 
One might demand a more precise, uncontroversial definition of 
the capacity for rationality than the common sense concept just de-
scribed, but such a demand would be unreasonable. The common 
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sense concept of rationality that we all employ is gro unded in o rdi-
nary human experience and in understanding of practical reason 
and its cr iti cal role in human interaction. It is a norm ative standard 
th at is a lways open to revisio n. 'We all everywhere and always use 
the o rdinary notion of the capaci ty for rat io nality to eva luate the 
conduct of ourselves and of others. it co ul d not be o therwise for 
creatu res like ourselves. To require more in ordin ary, pract ical 
human interaction , including the operat ion of our legal system, 
wou ld be imposs ibl e and unnecessary. T he burden of persuas ion 
sho uld be piacecl squarely on those who vv ish to abandon the lack 
of capacit y for rationality as the core non- responsibility condition. 
We are justified in asking for compelling reasons both to abandon 
the present standard and to adopt an alterna tive. 
An attractive feature of the account of the capacity for ratio nal-
ity as the touchstone of responsibility is that it does not commit 
one to any particular political, moral , or legal regime of responsi-
bility. Indeed, it makes normative debate about how much capacity 
is necessary for responsibility possible by providing the proper cri-
teria for such debate. The capacity for rationality is a continuum 
concept, and different amounts of the capacity might be required , 
depending on the context and on the individual and social interests 
at stake. Rationality standards for responsibility can thus vary geo-
graphically and temporally in response to evolving moral, political, 
and legal understandings. 
Our society is morally, legally, and constitutionally committed to 
the immense importance of individual liberty. Such a powerful 
commitment suggests that a severe defect in the capacity for ra-
tionality should be required to warrant a conclusion of sufficient 
non-responsibility to justify indefinite involuntary civil confine-
ment. Let us therefore turn to an analysis of how the lack of 
capacity for rationality standard would apply in the case of sexually 
violent predators. 
Most sexually violent agents are firmly in touch with reality, in-
strumentally rational, and fully aware of the applicable moral and 
lega l rules . The criteria for the recognized diagnoses that would 
probably apply to most sexual predators , the paraphilias and per-
sonality disorders such as Antisocial Personality Disorder, do not 
include cognitive defects that would lead to plausible claims to the 
I 
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contrary. 1n5 Predators who do not suffer from a recognized disorder 
do not suffer from severe cognitive or m0od defects because such 
defects virtually always would justify a diagnosis of a recognized 
disorder. Furthermore, although predators ' sexual desires and be-
havior may be statistically abnormal and morall y objectionable, 
predators are instrumentally rational when they satisfy those de-
Sires. 
One might claim that the sexual predators ' desires are them-
selves irrational. We do talk colloquially about the abnormality of 
desires, especially if most people cannot understand such desires , if 
the desires are intense, and if the desires are for goals that will 
cause the agent substantial interpersonal or legal trouble. Further, 
there have been philosophical attempts to make sense of talking 
about the substantive rationality of desires. These efforts have 
failed, however, because it is impossible uncontroversially to clas-
sify desires as irrational in themselves, 1116 and loose, colloquial usage 
cannot substitute for persuasive analysis when important matters 
of public policy are at stake. If a desire seems abnormal, it is natu-
ral to assume that there is some abnormal underlying cause. Even 
if some desires are considered a symptom of recognized mental 
disorders, however, it is not conceptually required that the desires 
be irrational or that the agent lack the general capacity for ration-
ality when the agent acts on those desires. 
In sum, it appears that most mentally abnormal sexual predators 
are fully responsible for their sexually predatory conduct, even if 
they suffer from a serious, recognized disorder, and, thus, they may 
fairly be criminally convicted for their sexual crimes. 107 But, for the 
same reason, most such predators do not meet the necessary non-
111' See, e.g. , DSM-IV-TR, supra note 50, at 566 (stating the "essential features" of 
the paraphilias: "recurrent, intense sexually arousing fantasies. sexual urges, or 
behaviors generally involving" inappropriate objects of sexual desire and contact, 
such as children). 
106 Nozick, supra note 66, at 139-40. 
107 Recall Justice Scalia's argument in Crane that predators who mee t the causal link 
standard are not deterrable and are , thus, distinguishable from ordinary recidivists , 
presumably because the predators are not responsible. Kansas v. Crane, 534 U.S. 407, 
122 S. Ct. 867, 874 (2002) (Scalia, J., dissenting). Because most predators will satisfy 
the causal link standard, one wonders if Justice Scalia meant to imply that almost 
none are criminally responsible and should be acquitted at a criminal trial by reason 
of insanity, thus obviating th e need for predator commitments. 
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responsibility standard that might justify involuntary civil confine-
ment. T herefore, I am claiming that, holding the agent's capacity 
for rati onality constant, the eli gibility for punishment and the eligi-
bi lity for in voluntary civil confinement are mutually exclusive .1"' 
T here is one argument about the lack of capacity for rationality 
that rnight apply in a limited number of sexual predation cases . 
These wo uld include cases in which the agent' s desire is so powe r-
fu l and insistent th at it gen uinely compromises the agent's ability 
to th ink st raight, to bring reason to bear on why the person should 
not ac t to satisfy the desire. 10~ In a rather straightforward sense. 
some reople in the throes of intense desires may be genuinely un-
able to think of anything except satisfying the desire . The build-up 
of the desire and its non-sa tisfaction may cause further distracting 
and often unpleasant feeling states, such as anxi e ty, irritation, ex-
citement , tension , and the like. If an agent cannot think of anything 
else and strongly desires satisfaction, it is much more likely that the 
agent will act, especially if there is no immediate external circum-
stance , such as a police officer at the elbow, to concentrate the 
agen t's attention. In such cases, fundamental components of ra-
tionality, such as the capacities to think clearly and to evaluate self-
consciously one's reasons for action, may be severely compro-
mised. The agent may find it extremely difficult to contemplate 
alternatives or coherently to weigh alternatives. 
Let us apply this analysis to the case of the sexual predator. 
U rges will arise , temptations will certainly occur, and opportunities 
to act on those urges and temptations will inevitably present them-
selves, despite attempts to avoid urges, temptations, and 
opportunities. Depending on the situation and on the agent's mental 
condition , the agent may be subject to the kinds of difficulties just 
described and may act with diminished capacity for rational 
thought at that moment. Even then, the predator is not entirely 
reward-insensitive , and some reasons will affect him. Assuming 
that the predator wants to live, a gun at his head will give him suffi-
cient reason not to assault others, and he will not do so. 1w 
'"' I bo rrow the term "eligib ility" from Kyron Huigens, Solving the Apprendi Puzzle, 
90 Geo. L.J. 387, 419-20 (2002) (discussing eligibility for punishment). 
'"' Sec Morse, supra note 88, a t 38- 40. 
"" As Dr. Johnson fam ously sa id , "D epend upon it , Sir, whe n a man knows he is to 
be hanged in a fortnight , it concentra tes hi s mind wond erfully." James BoswelL 2 The 
• 
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Nevertheless , this kind of brute "management" technique is not 
generally feasible. and the predator may indeed find it exce ption-
ally hard to bring reason to bear on some occasions. 
Assuming that intense sexual desires can sometimes substan-
tially compromise rationality and, thus, potentially can negate 
responsibility for acting on those desires, a fundamental questi on 
remains: Is the agent suffering from a rationality defect nonetht> 
less responsible because he has placed himself in the situation in 
which rationality may be compromised, and is he aware o r the 
usual consequences of diminished rationality? E ven if intense 
urges of certain kinds are properly characterized as symptom s and 
are not the agent's fault , no agent always experiences those urges 
with th e requisite intensity to diminish rationality. Between periods 
when the urges are intense, most agents are capable of substantia l 
rationality. 
If an agent knows from experience that the urges are recurrent 
and that on previous occasions the agent has acted on those urges 
in a state of diminished rationality, the agent also knows during 
more rational moments that he is at risk for acting in such a state in 
the future. It is a citizen's duty in such circumstances to take all 
reasonable steps to prevent oneself from acting wrongly in an irra-
tional state in the future, including drastically limiting one's life 
activities if such an intrusive step is necessary to prevent serious 
harm. If the agent does not take such steps, the agent may indeed 
be responsible, even if at the moment of acting he suffers from sub-
stantially compromised capacity for rationality. The situation 
would be analogous to the case of a person who suffered from a 
physical disorder that recurrently produced irrational mental states 
or blackouts during which the person caused harm, but who did not 
take sufficient steps to prevent such harm in the future. We would 
surely not excuse such an agent. 111 Even if it is predictable that the 
agent will not take those steps and will behave non-responsibly and 
dangerously in the future, recall that predictability is not per se a 
Life of Samuel Johnson, LL.D. 360 (Macmillan & Co. 1912). See also supra note 89 
(discussing the gun hypothetical). 
111 See, e.g. , People v. Decina, 138 N.E.2d 799 (N.Y. 1956) (upholding the conviction 
for culpable homicide of the driver of an automobile who suffered from epilepsy. 
experienced a seizure that caused unconsciousness. and caused death while 
unconscious). 
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non- responsibility condition. 112 Thus. many of the predators who 
become substantially irrational at the time of their sexual assaults 
may nonetheless be responsible and may deserve conviction, but 
the ir condition might not warrant indefinite involuntary civil con-
finement. 
A nother important considerati on conce rnin g the rationality of 
sexua l predators concerns the relation be tween psychopathy and 
sexual violence. Although the criteria for psychopathy are some-
\vhat controversial, it is best characterized as a psychological 
abnormality marked by, inter alia, an incapacity for empathy, guilt. 
an d remorse, and by impulsivity, egocentricity, and chronic viola-
tions of social, moral, and legal norms. 1JJ The condition is not 
synonymous with the recognized disorder , Antisocial Personality 
Disorder ("APD") , that the Diagnostic and Statistical Ivianual of 
Mental Disorders contains, but some people with psychopathy 
meet the criteria for APD , and some people with APD also suffer 
from psychopathy. 114 The lack of capacity for empathy, guilt, and 
remorse is one of the factors that differentiates the two conditions . 
T his lack of capacity is a necessary feature of psychopathy but not 
of APD. Otherwise, unless they have a co-occurring psychotic dis-
order, people with psychopathy are entirely in touch with reality , 
instrumentally rational, and know the applicable moral and legal 
rules. They simply do not "get" the point of morality and cannot be 
guided by it. They are guided only by the fear of sanctions. 
Now, suppose that the predator lacks the capacity for empathy, 
guilt, and remorse. Such affective capacities provide people with 
the best reasons and motivation not to harm others. For most citi-
zens, conscience and empathy are the most powerful prophylaxes 
against wrong conduct and are much more powerful than fear of 
lie Compare the case of a recidivist fe lon who always commits crimes under the 
intluence of mind-alte ring substances that the fe lon takes for the purpose of 
bolste ring his courage. Altho ugh the fe lon knows that the substances will diminish his 
ra ti o nality, and we know that substa nce use and subseque nt irrationality is an entire ly 
predictable modus operandi, th e felon would be criminally responsible and not civilly 
committable. 
II.' See Robert D. Hare, Psychopaths and Their Nature : Implications for the Mental 
H ealth and Criminal Justice Systems, in Psychopathy: Antisocial, Criminal and 
Violent Behavior 188 (Theodore Millon et al. eds., 1998) . 
11 ' A lv A. DahL Psychopathy and Psychiatric Comorbiclity, in Millon et al. , supra 
note 11 3, a t 291-92. 
I 
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the criminal sancti o n. If these capacities are lacking, it is plausible 
to argue that the agent lacks moral rationali ty and is not resp onsi-
ble , even if the agent is in touch with rea lity ot herwise and knows 
th e moral rules in the narrowest sense .11 ' In crimin al law, of course, 
lack of these capaciti es is not an excusing condition , a lthough such 
a defect sure ly pred isposes an agent to do '<Vrong. 11'' T hus, although 
some sexual predators rnay lack conscience and empathy beca use 
they al so suffer from psyc hopathy, in our lega l cu lture, psychopa-
thy is not a promising normative ground for non- responsibil ity . 
It would, of course, be poss ible to claim that a lack of capacity 
for conscience and empctthy is adequate grou nd for the co nclusion 
thctt the e~gent is suffici ently irrational and non-responsible to jus-
tify indefinite civil commi tment. The civil commitment and criminal 
justice systems can employ di ffere nt rationality standards. But if an 
agent is sufficiently rational to deserve criminal conviction and 
punishment, the most intrusive, afflictive actions the state can im-
pose on a citizen, the agent is surely rational enough to be left at 
liberty until the agent commits a crime or becomes genuinely non-
responsible. Civil commitment should be justified only in cases in 
which the agent's rationality is sufficiently impaired also to avoid 
crimina 1 responsibility .11 7 
So far, it appears that application of the lack of the capacity for 
rationality standard leads to the conclusion that most sexual preda-
tors are responsible for sexually violent conduct. In some cases, 
however, we may plausibly infer th at sexual predators may have a 
general , rather than an intermittent , time-limi ted defect in the ca-
pacity for rationality that might genuine ly undermine responsibility 
for sexually predatory behavior. For example, suppose the preda-
,,; See Susan Wolf, Freedom Within Reason 121 (1990); see also David Gauthier, 
Morals By Agreement 327-28 (1986) (arguing that mora l co nduct requires agents to 
have an "a ffectiv e capacity for morality,' ' described as the capacity to have their 
"emotions and fee lings e ngaged by what they recognize as mora l considerations"). 
''' Model Penal Code§ 4.01(2) (Proposed Official Draft 1962). 
117 This might suggest that civilly commi ttab le sexual predators who have been 
convicted should have been acq uitted by reason of insanity and then committed on 
th at unco ntrove rsial ground , thereby obviating the need fo r sexual predator 
commitments . In some cases, however, it is possible tha t, a lthough the predato r was 
responsible a t th e time of the cri me, the predato r 's condition de te riorated thereafter, 
and he is no longer respo nsibl e at the time of commitment. I assume that such cases 
would be few. Furth ermore, increasing age diminishes th e probability o f vio lent 
cond uct. 
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ti on has been frequent , it has previously led to conviction and im-
prisonment , and incarceration is a profoundly unpleasant experience 
for the predator. Such a history is precise ly the type that justifies a 
recognized psychi atric diagnosis. Even in the absence of psycho tic 
cognition. in some cases continued predation simply may not ma ke 
rati onal se nse either to the predator or to anyone else. The preda-
tor may have no reasonable explanation for why he did not tic 
hirn se l f to the mast, did not take the preventive measures necessary 
to avoid hated imprisonment. The agent simply cannot think 
straight about what to do, even when not aroused, and continues to 
put himse lf in harm's way without, apparently , the rational capacity 
to deliberate about how to avoid such situations. 
O ne can speculate about the mechanism that produces a genera l 
lack of capacity for rationality in such cases, but such speculation is 
less important than the recognition that a small number of sexual 
predators may have a rationality defect that extends generally over 
the domain of sexual behavior. These cases will be worrisome be-
cause the predator will otherwise seem responsible. Depending on 
the history, however, a conclusion of non-responsibility about sex-
ual behavior may be warranted, and involuntary civil commitment 
might be justified. Leroy Hendricks may have presented precisely 
this case. I assume that such cases will be few, and that, in many of 
them, the predator should have been acquitted by reaso n of insan-
ity and uncontroversially committed on that ground. 
In addition to being the best positive and normative explanation 
of non-responsibility, lack of capacity for rationality also may be 
easily and reliably evaluated. It is an ordinary, everyday, common 
sense standard that we all use all the time to evaluate the behavior 
of ourselves and others. Lay people may not know the causes and 
correlates of rationality defects, but they surely know such defects 
when they see them. Rationality defects are the core of a m ental 
health professional's clinical expertise. The inability of mental 
health science fully to understand the biological, psychological, or 
sociological causes of rationality defects does not prevent lay peo-
ple and experts alike from effectively evaluating the capacity for 
rationality. Human beings recognized incomprehensible irrational-
ity in others long before they had an inkling of the genuine causal 
variables that might produce such a state. 
I 
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Using a rationality standard will permit mental hea lth profes-
sionals readily to explain and legal decisionmakers easily to 
und erstand the precise behavioral grounds for inferring that an 
agent suffers fro m ra tionality defects. What is primarily required is 
simply a thick descriptio n of th e agent's cognitive , emot ional, and 
behavi oral functioning, and, ultimate ly, of the age nt's reaso ns for 
action. Good clini cians are trained to obtain such thorough de-
scriptions by ca reful clini ca l evaluation using multiple da ta sources, 
and th ey are the raw materials that all people usc to assess 
rationality. Experts eva luating the rationality stand a rd will be able 
to avoid the type of un scientific, conclusory reasoning th at marks 
conclusions about control defects, and legal evaluation will be un-
contaminated by confusing, metaphorical evide nce. F ina lly, lega l 
decisionmakers can decide, without confusion , whether an agent's 
functioning meets the applicable, normative standard of lack of ra-
tion al capacity, because evaluating rationality against some 
normative standard is essentially the same type of assessment of ra-
tionality that all people make all the time. 
In sum, lack of capacity for rationality is the best explanation of 
and the most workable standard for non-responsibility. It is also 
the best explanation of what we really mean when we say that an 
agent cannot control himself. Control standards should be under-
stood in terms of rationality defects. When used to assess whether 
sexually violent people may be involuntarily civilly committed , the 
irrationality standard will provide a morally, politically, and legally 
justifiable limiting condition for the massive deprivation of liberty 
that results. 
CONCLUSION 
Liberty and safety are precious to human flourishing , but efforts 
to protect both can conflict. Our society protects itself by criminal 
punishment and involuntary civil commitment, but both represent 
massive intrusions on liberty that require weighty justification. 
Thus, we limit criminal incarceration to those agents who have cul-
pably committed a crime, and we limit involuntary commitment to 
those agents who are not responsible for their legally relevant be-
havior, such as dangerous conduct. 
Constitutional limitations on the state's p~wer to confine citizens 
based on our concern for liberty inevitably mean that th e protec-
1076 Virginia Lmv Review [Vol. 88:1025 
tion of social safety cannot be seamless and that security will be 
compromised. Some dangerous but responsible agen ts must remain 
free until they commit a crime or until they become non-
responsible for their potential da nger. As a res ult , our justifiable, 
appropria te fear of the harms such people may ca use creates strong 
incentives to devise means to confine them preventive ly. Pure pre-
ventive detention on gro un ds of dangerous ness alone is an 
anathema in a fre e society, however. and we should not loosen the 
standards of non-responsibi li tv to S\YCCD into civi l confinement re-
o l 
sponsible agents who shou ld more appropriate ly be incapacitated 
by criminal sentences. As J ustice Anthony Ke nnedy warned in hi s 
concurrence in Hendricks and as a ll the Justices in Crane appar-
ently agreed, civil commitment should not be used to impose 
punishment or to avo id the effects of deficiencies in the criminal 
justice system, such as improvident plea bargains, which might 
cause the legally required but objectionably early release of dan-
gerous criminals. w: 
States could, of course, achieve essentially indefinite confine-
ment through the criminal justice system by imposing life sentences 
on sexual offenders. There would be no constitutional objection 
under current proportionality jurisprudence,119 and many would ac-
cept that such sentences would be deserved . Thus, perhaps we 
should not worry about the potentially extensive reach of various 
control criteria for the civil commitment of sexual predators be-
cause sexually violent offenders will remain incarcerated for very 
long periods in any case. But this would be an unacceptably skepti-
cal, consequential approach to the danger sexual predation presents. 1211 
1" Kansas v. Crane, 534 U.S . 407, 122 S. Ct. 856,862 (2002) (Kennedy, J. , concurring); 
Kansas v. Hendricks, 521 U.S. 346. 373 (1997). Ind eed. Crane himself was sentenced to 
a re la ti ve ly brief term o f imprisonment as a result of a plea bargain under 
circumstances tha t might o the rwise have justified a prison te rm of thirty-five yea rs to 
life. In re C rane , 3 P.3cl 285, 287 (Kan. 2000). 
119 Harmelin v. Michigan, 501 U.S. 957 (1991) (upholding a sentence of life imprisonment 
without possibility of pa ro le for a first-t im e offender convicted of possessing 672 
grams o f cocaine and holding that the E ighth Amendm ent conta ins no proportionality 
guarantee applicable to terms of imprisonment, except, perhaps, for a ridicul ously 
ex tre me case such as life imprisonment for a parking viola tion). 
1"'Thi s objection al so bears a st unning resemblance to pas t cla ims that th e insanity 
d efense should be aboli shed because people acqu itted by reaso n of insanity are 
incarce ra ted in any case. See Josep h Goldstein & J ay Ka tz, Abo li sh the " Insan ity 
Defense"-Why not? , 72 Ya le L.J. 853, 864- 70 (1963) . T hese cla ims we re misgu ided 
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T he law sets moral standards and should be clear about which 
agents are responsi ble . Moreover, if sexual d;;mgerousness were 
treated virtuall y exclusively within the crimina l jus tice system, leg-
islators woul d be forced to confront and to defend , in the poli tica l 
process, the sen tences they are wil ling to impose on sexual offend-
ers, rather than sweepi ng this morall y-fraugh t question unde r the 
psychiatric rug. fi na lly, prosecutors wou ld be fo rced straightfor·· 
-,vardly to evaluate the stre ngth of their cDscs and would no t be 
able to rely on ci vil commi tme nt to remedy the effec ts of weak 
cases or improvident ol ea ba rgains. 
1 ~ 
Indefinite involuntary civil commitm en t should be imposed only 
if an agent is genuinely non-responsi ble. Caused link standards , 
which require only th at some mental abnormality predispose the 
agent to sexually violent conduct , are not limiting conditions, even 
in principle , because a causal link does not entail non-
responsibility. Moreover, lay people commonly but erroneously in-
fe r non-responsibility from the presence of a ca usa l link, so this 
standard may be prejudicial and confusing, as well as over-
inclusive. T he causal link standard thus poses an unacceptable 
threat to civil liberty because it would permit the indefinite invol-
untary civil commitment of large numbers of alleged predators who 
are in fact responsible and who should be incapacita ted by appro-
priate criminal punishment. 
Loss of control is a limiting standard in principle fo r justifiable 
involuntary commitment, but it is conceptually confused and fails 
to provide adequate guidance either to experts who evaluate al-
leged sexual predators or to legal decisionmakers who must decide 
if an alleged predator is not responsible . A lthough the majority in 
Crane properly rejected a pure causal link standard and sought a 
genuinely limiting standard that would identify non-responsible 
sexual predators, the serious lack of control standard cannot sa tisfy 
the purpose for which it was designed. It will provide no practical 
limit to civil commitment of sexually violent people. 
Lack of capacity for ration ality is the best and most workable 
non-responsibility standard. It provides a prope r limitation on the 
scope of involuntary commitment and the most understandable , 
practical guidance to mental health professionals and legal deci-
for the same reasons that it is import a nt to di stingui sh respo nsible fro m non-
responsibl e sexual pred ators. 
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sionmakers. Control defects should be understood and adjudicated 
in terms of rationality defect s, which are the best explanation of 
control problems. The ration a lity standard thus provides the bes t 
safeguard both of civil liberty and of the distinction betwee n civil 
and criminal justice. 
